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Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and
Demand for Chemical Information
John S. Applegate
I.

Introduction

Since the beginning of serious environmental regulation in the 1970s,
the United States (and later Europe) has increasingly, and seemingly
inexorably, adopted a risk-based approach to the regulation of environmental
threats and, in particular, of toxic chemicals and pesticides. In these
regulatory systems-the Toxic Substances Control Act' (TSCA); the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 2 (FIFRA); and the toxics
provisions of general pollution statutes 3-the extent of regulation is primarily
determined by a highly quantitative evaluation of the toxic potency of a
chemical and the degree of human exposure, resulting in quantitative
assessment of the likelihood of harm to human health. An aggressive and
comprehensive program of chemical regulation is severely restricted by the
information demands of this approach, however, because a wide "data gap"
exists between the information required to justify regulation and the
information that is actually available.
This Article has three objectives and three central Parts. First, it traces
the rise of risk as the basis for chemical regulation, distinguishing between
two different meanings and functions of risk in chemical regulation. Second,
it demonstrates how the adoption of particular risk-based strategies can result
in a severe imbalance between the demand for and the supply of chemical
information.4 Third, building on the different functions and meanings of risk,
it offers a fundamentally different approach to chemical regulation, which
reduces the demand for chemical information (bridging the data gap, so to
speak) rather than attempting the ultimately unattainable goal of completely
supplying it (filling the gap). This Article is thus a variation on the
Symposium theme of "harnessing the power of information": It advocates
harnessing the demand for information as the most promising way to make
*

Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law and Executive Associate Dean for Academic Affairs,

Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
I am grateful to the organizers of this
Symposium, Tom McGarity, Wendy Wagner, and Lynn Blais, for the invitation to participate in an
extraordinary conference, to the other participants for many invaluable insights, and to the editors of
the Texas Law Review for shepherding this project to completion.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000).
2. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
3. E.g., Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-I (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412(r) (2000).
4. The term "chemical information" as used herein refers to scientific and technical information
about a chemical's effects on human health and the environment.
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the existing and foreseeable supply of chemical information more effective in
supporting a robust program of protective regulation.
II. The Rise of Risk
Risk has a lengthy history in the legal response to damage to persons
and property, and over time different legal frameworks have emphasized
different functions and meanings of risk.5 Before tracing the conceptual
development of risk, therefore, it will help to distinguish the functions and
meanings. In order to be effective, or even coherent, a regulatory system
must describe both the preexisting conditions that call for regulatory
attention and the future conditions that regulatory action is supposed to
achieve. The "before" and "after" states of the world can be called the
trigger and standard,respectively.6 The trigger defines the problem, and the
standard describes the appropriate regulatory response. Thus, under the
Clean Air Act, 7 if the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) finds that a
facility is emitting a hazardous air pollutant (the trigger), then it must apply
restrictions equivalent to the maximum achievable control technology (the
standard).8 Under the Delaney Clause, 9 if the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) finds that a nonpesticide chemical causes cancer in man or animal
(trigger), then it must prohibit the use of the chemical as a food additive
(standard). 10

5. This conceptual framework is detailed in John S. Applegate, Introduction: Environmental
Risk. Defining the Problem and Discipliningthe Response, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF
ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: ENVIRONMENTAL RISK, at xiii, xiii-xxiv (John S. Applegate
ed., 2004) (explaining the difference between risk as risk assessment and risk as environmental
harm, and discussing three ways in which risk assessment can be used to discipline environmental
regulation). Others have told a similar story. See Elizabeth Fisher, Risk and EnvironmentalLaw: A
Beginner's Guide, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY 97, 97-125 (Richard Woods et
al. eds., 2006) (providing a brief history of the use of risk assessment in U.S. environmental law);
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT RISK: RESTORING A
PRAGMATIC APPROACH 3-7 (2003) (discussing early legal efforts to manage environmental risk).
6. This terminology follows that of SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 5, at 31. Cf, John S.
Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, Information, and Regulatory Structure in Toxic Substances
Control, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 277, 305-06 (1992) (using the terms "predicate" and "target").
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2000).
8. Id. § 7412(d)(2). A secondary standard is based on health. Id. § 7412(0(2).
9. Food Additives Amendment of 1958 (Delaney Clause), Pub. L. No. 85-929, 72 Stat. 1784,
1786 (codified in pertinent part at 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (2000)).
10. See Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ("For carcinogens,
however, [the Delaney Clause] framed the issue in the simple form, 'If A [finding that cancer is
induced in man or animals], then B [no listing]."'); see also 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (stating that
no listing shall be issued if the Secretary fails to establish that the proposed use of the food additive
will be safe, and any additive found to induce cancer when ingested in man or animal shall not be
deemed safe). Pesticide residues are handled separately. Id. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii). Some regulatory
structures define both trigger and standard in the same terms. For example, TSCA uses
"unreasonable risk" for both purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(2) (2000); see also Applegate, supra
note 6, at 306 (using the term "unreasonable risk").
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As we will see, risk has been used for both of these functions in
chemical regulation, that is, as the definition of the problem to be solved and
as the means of disciplining or constraining the response to the identified
risk. Risk is able to perform these dual functions because it has two distinct
lexical meanings. According to Merriam-Webster's, risk means both
"possibility of loss or injury" and "the chance of loss or the perils to the
subject matter of an insurance contract; also: the degree of probability of
such loss."" The first has an open-ended meaning roughly equivalent to
"danger" or "threat." The second meaning is probabilistic and implies
greater precision. It suggests a quantitative approach to describing the extent
of the likelihood of a harm occurring. 2
A. Defining the Problem
The default or baseline legal response to physical harm is the tort
system, which provides a remedy for those who have suffered harm due to
someone else's actions. The tort system is almost entirely retrospective. It
reduces the number or severity of future harms only indirectly, if at all, by
threatening that "negligent" behavior will be taxed with the cost of the harm
it causes. 13 Negligence can be measured in several ways, such as reference
to "reasonableness" or to industry custom. 14 Another technique, which has
become the foundation of the law-and-economics approach, 15 uses Judge
Learned Hand's famous B < P x L formula: a defendant is negligent when
the burden of taking precautions would have been less than the expected
value of the harm (that is, the loss discounted by its probability).' 6 Hand's
formula in effect defines negligence as an unreasonably high risk, and under
this approach a defendant who exposes others to such a risk should expect to
pay for harm caused thereby.
Environmental legislation can be understood as a response to a number7
of important limitations of the tort system in the environmental setting.
First, whereas tort law seeks to repair or compensate a harm that has already
occurred, the raison d'tre of environmental regulation is the prevention of
harm before it occurs. The court in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA' 8 explained,
11. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1076 (11th ed. 2004).
12. Fisher, supra note 5, at 97, 109-16. Professor Adler offers a more elaborate analysis of the
probabilistic meaning of risk. See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative
Foundation of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293, 1310-16 (2003) (looking at the Bayesian
and frequentist theories of probability in the context of a probabilistic meaning of risk).
13. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 244-

65 (1970). Strict liability has a similar effect on the activities to which it attaches. See id. at 13
(discussing strict liability as a subset of tort law).
14. David Hunter & James Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate
Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1773 (2007).
15. Richard A. Posner, A Theory ofNegligence, I J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32-34 (1972).
16. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
17. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 5, at 5-7.
18. 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
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"Regulatory action may be taken before the threatened harm occurs; indeed,
the very existence of such precautionary legislation would seem to demand
that regulatory action precede, and, optimally, prevent, the perceived
threat." 19 Prevention is also preferable to repair because many of the things
that tort law compensates-lives, health, suffering, lost time--cannot be
restored with money, or at all. Avoidance is more humane and usually less
costly than restoration. As the Council for Environmental Quality (CEQ)
stated, "We need no longer be limited to repairing damage after it has been
done; nor should we allow the general population to be used as a laboratory
for discovering adverse health effects. 2 °
Second, being retrospective and reparative, tort law demands a high
standard of proof of causation of the individual plaintiffs harm. 2 1 While this
is a serious obstacle to proving toxic causation,22 it is a defensible policy in
the great majority of tort cases in which the harm, having already occurred,
can be traced back to the defendant's conduct in a deterministic manner. To
achieve a preventive objective, however, regulation must be anticipatory in
the sense that the degree of certainty of causation must be relaxed to permit
prediction in advance of actual harm. Moreover, "some of the questions
involved in the promulgation of [environmental] standards are on the
frontiers of scientific knowledge, and consequently as to them insufficient
23
data is presently available to make a fully informed factual determination.,
The precautionary principle, a nearly ubiquitous feature of recent
international environmental agreements, embodies the anticipatory approach
by rejecting demands for "full scientific certainty" when faced with "threats
of serious or irreversible damage. 2 4
Third, tort law permits (indeed, encourages) risk creators to reach their
own economic decisions about the level of risk that they are willing to
impose on others, because the tort mechanism of monetary damages operates
as an incentive system rather than as a set of specific commands for specific

19. Id. at 13.
20. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, Toxic SUBSTANCES 21 (1971), reprinted in H. COMM. ON
INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC

SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 757, 784 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter TOXIC SUBSTANCES].
21. See Tseming Yang, Environmental Regulation. Tort Law and Environmental Justice: What
Could Have Been, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 607, 623 (2002) ("[Pjroof of causation [in environmental tort
suits], both general and specific, has been one of the most significant hurdles for plaintiffs.").
22. See John S. Applegate, The Perils of UnreasonableRisk: Information, Regulatory Policy,
and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 264-66 (1991) (describing the long latency
periods, relatively rare effects, probabilistic causation, and nonsignature disease characteristics of
toxic harm). See generally Talbot Page, A Generic View of Toxic Chemicals and Similar Risks, 7
ECOLOGY L.Q. 207 (1978) (detailing the various problems of environmental nsk that make it less
easily managed by legal and regulatory institutions, including its concern to avoid false negatives,
rules of liability, and burden-shifting from proof of absolute safety to proof of danger).
23. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
24. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, princ. 15, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 15 1/5/Rev. I (June
13, 1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 874, 879 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
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actions. Potential defendants are free to choose to risk paying damages, and
this aspect of the tort system is often praised as permitting efficient decision
making by potential defendants.25 However, as Judge Calabresi observed
many years ago, there are also situations in which society may legitimately
decide that a collective determination of the level of safety (the inverse of
risk) is appropriate-situations in which normative concerns for avoiding
harm trump economic efficiency.26 Regulatory commands, unlike tort law,
do not typically offer the option of choosing to harm.
Risk came to define the regulatory problematique because it elegantly
defines all three departures from the tort paradigm. A preventive system can
be founded on risk because risk is the forward-looking description of as yet
inchoate harm. It is no coincidence that the CEQ followed its description of
the need for prevention, above, with advocacy of a statute that prevented
"unreasonable risk,, 27 nor that the Ethyl Corp. court spoke of the need to
"assess risks" as the antithesis of "a high quantum of factual proof, proof of
actual harm rather than of a 'significant risk of harm."' 28 Likewise, risk is
anticipatory in that it does not require certainty of actual outcomes in a
deterministic sense. Last, risk reflects a legislative judgment that dangerous
activities are, if not entirely unacceptable, at least subject to collective
control.
This use of risk functions as a trigger for regulatory action because it
defines the universe of governmental concern and tells regulators what
requires their attention. In performing this particular function, risk does not
establish standards for determining how much danger is desirable or
acceptable. Instead it is a binary concept in which a substance or activity is
either safe or unsafe. This meaning of risk is embodied in, for example, the
requirement to set emissions levels for toxic air pollutants that are safe with
"an ample margin of safety to protect public health,, 29 which is a coherent
standard only if safety is an on-or-off, yes-or-no proposition. This view of
risk has been dubbed "hazard, 30 and it reflects the first definition of risk
quoted above.

25. See Katrina M. Wyman, The Measure of Just Compensation, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 239,
246 (2007) (stating that tort liability forces decision makers to internalize the costs of their actions,
thereby encouraging efficient decision making).
26. CALABRESI, supra note 13, at 95-107.
27. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(f)(1), 2605(a) (2000); TOXIC SUBSTANCES, supra note 20, at 784.
28. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
29. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f)(2)(A) (2000). The difficulties of this approach in the
pre-1990 version of § 7412 are discussed in the Vinyl Chloridecase, NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146,
1163-66 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
30. See generally John S. Applegate, The Taming of the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 27 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 13, 34-50 (2002) (discussing the evolution of the precautionary
principle from hazard to risk (meaning risk-as-probability)).

1370

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 86:1365

B. Discipliningthe Response
Risk-as-hazard is a very open-ended criterion for regulation, because
most chemicals have some harm-causing potential. In fact, our general
experience of the industrial world is that hazards abound, and we navigate

the world with the aid of a rough sense of the degrees of danger. The rise of
the negligence standard in the nineteenth century was itself an
acknowledgement that a risk-free industrial society is unobtainable.3 1 That is
certainly the lesson that EPA and other federal agencies drew as their

experience with binary statutory commands increased.
In addition to the everyday sense that a risk-free world is impossible,
emerging understanding of the mechanisms of cancer produced a parallel
conclusion for toxic substances.32 Environmentally induced cancer was
found to be a probabilistic rather than deterministic phenomenon, caused
by-to simplify greatly-the interactions of individual molecules of certain
substances within individual cells.33 One cannot know in advance whether a
particular exposure will cause cancer in a particular individual, but one can
say that the greater the exposure, the greater the odds of cancer occurring.
Moreover, under the conservative "one-hit" model of carcinogenesis,
carcinogens have no threshold level of exposure below which the probability

of injury drops to zero.34 The only exposure that can definitively be called
safe under this model is no exposure at all. Under these conditions, as an
EPA deputy administrator put it, "Many EPA professionals no longer used

bi-modal terms such as safe or unsafe, but rather began to think and talk in
probabilistic terms.,, 35 The question was no longer the existence of a risk,
but its extent-and ultimately its acceptability-along a spectrum of
likelihood of harm that ranges from zero, to small and acceptable levels of
risk, to unacceptably high levels of risk, to certainty of harm.

31. Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873), rejected the strict liability rule of Rylands v.
Fletcher,(1868) L.R. 3 (H.L.) 330 (appeal taken from Exch.) (U.K.), expressly to support "modem,
progressive, industrial pursuits." Brown, 53 N.H. at 450. See also CALABRESI, supra note 13, at
237-87 (criticizing the fault system as an effective method of risk reduction by analyzing the
problems it poses to systems of deterrence and accident cost allocation that seek to minimize the
risks society inevitably faces); Posner, supra note 15 (explaining why the no-fault rule of liability
was replaced by the negligence standard).
32. Applegate, supra note 22, at 264-65; see also Fisher, supra note 5, at 97, 104-05
(describing the origins of risk assessment in federal agencies); JOSEPH V. RODRICKS, CALCULATED
RISKS: THE TOXICITY AND HUMAN HEALTH RISKS OF CHEMICALS IN OUR ENVIRONMENT 116-20

(1992) (identifying the lifestyle choices and environmental conditions linked with the development
of cancer, and highlighting the difficulty in avoiding exposure to all such cancer risk factors).
33. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY INDUCED CANCER AND THE LAW: RISKS,

REGULATION AND VICTIM COMPENSATION 3-7 (1989) (outlining the process by which certain
foreign substances enter the human body, are broken down by it, and lead to the growth of
cancerous cells).
34. See KOFI ASANTE-DUAH, PUBLIC HEALTH RISK ASSESSMENT 154 (2002) (describing the

one-hit model of carcinogenesis).
35. Al Aim, Why We Didn't Use "Risk" Before, EPA J., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 13, 14.
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Because risk-as-hazard is open-ended, it implies relatively draconian
regulatory responses to the existence of a risk: if a risk exists, it should be
eliminated.
Not surprisingly, this use of risk engenders enormous
Substantive discipline is
counterpressure to constrain its application.
exercised, in part, through the establishment of a postregulation goal or
standardthat tells an agency how to respond to the universe of problems that
has been defined for it. 36 Before 1990, § 112 of the Clean Air Act
established a trigger for regulating hazardous air pollutants: "may reasonably
be anticipated to result in an increase in mortality or an increase in serious
irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness. ' 37 For any air pollutant so
identified, EPA was required to set an emission standard that "provides an
ample margin of safety to protect the public health., 38 Since true protection
with an ample margin of safety could only be a ban on emissions (or
something very close to it), 39 EPA issued a mere seven air-pollution
standards in the twenty years of the pre-1990 section's existence.40
Congress, in other words, defined the problem broadly but failed to discipline
the response sufficiently to make regulation politically feasible for the
regulatory agency. 4 '
For chemical regulation, the probabilistic meaning of risk provided the
perfect conceptual framework for reorienting risk to discipline the response.
As probabilistic thinking took hold, risk was available to express not simply
the potential for harm, but also the extent of the potential harm. This
development took place initially when FDA tried to cope with the Delaney
Clause. It is the apotheosis of the risk-as-hazard paradigm, because it flatly
bans as a food additive any substance that causes cancer in humans or
animals at any level of potency or exposure.4 2 While FDA never fully

36. Positive political theory has noted this dynamic in the more general problem of open-ended
delegation of regulatory authority from Congress to regulatory agencies. Lisa Schultz Bressman,
Proceduresas Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1752-53 (2007); see also
Applegate, supra note 6, at 289-304 (descnbing the tension between Congress's impulses both to
grant agencies wide discretion and to direct their actions closely).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(a)(1) (1988) (amended 1990).
38. Id. § 7412(b)(1)(B).
39. The D.C. Circuit, confronted with the original § 112 in the Vinyl Chloride case, recognized
the problem and acknowledged that to "protect the public health" is not necessarily "risk-free." The
court nevertheless found itself compelled to accept the extraordinary strictness of the § 112
standard. NRDC v. EPA (Vinyl Chloride), 824 F.2d 1146, 1147, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc).
40. JOHN S. APPLEGATE ET AL., THE REGULATION OF Toxic SUBSTANCES AND HAZARDOUS

WASTES 490 (2000). To give a sense of scale, when Congress amended § 112, it listed 189
hazardous air pollutants for which EPA was required to establish standards. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 104 Stat. 2531 (codified as amended at 42

U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1) (1988 & Supp. 11 1990)).
41. Congress's solution in 1990, discussed in subpart IV(C), infra, was to retain risk as the
trigger but abandon it as the standard.
42. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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succeeded in escaping the binary nature of the Delaney framework, 43 it
worked with other agencies to develop a new probabilistic44mechanism for
measuring the spectrum of risk: quantitative risk assessment.
In the process described in the 1983 National Research Council report,
45
Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Progress
(universally known as the Red Book, for its cover), the first step of
quantitative risk assessment is the determination of risk-as-hazard-"hazard
identification., 46 The Red Book procedure goes on to estimate the potency of
the substance ("dose-response assessment") 47 and the level of actual
exposure ("exposure assessment"). 48 The resulting product of dose-response
and exposure ("risk characterization") tells the regulator quantitatively where
49
on the spectrum of danger a particular chemical or activity lies.
Furthermore, the Red Book separates the foregoing steps, known collectively
as risk assessment, which is regarded as an objective and scientific process,
from risk management, which is a judgmental and essentially political
process.50 The assessment-management distinction underscores the ideas
that risk can be a relative concept, and that the regulatory response to risk can
and should be informed and constrained by economic and political
concerns. 5 1 Thus, the need to discipline risk created the need for an
appropriate analytical tool, 52 and the development of the tool reciprocally
encouraged the use of risk to discipline regulation.5 3 Risk became risk
assessment.54

43. See Pub. Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (rejecting FDA's de
minimis interpretation of the Delaney Clause). The FDA eventually obtained relief in the 1996
Food Quality Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (codified in scattered sections of
7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000)), which amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
(FDCA), 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000), to include pesticides.
44. Joseph V. Rodricks, Origins of Risk Assessment in Food Safety Decision Making, 7 J. AM.
C. OF TOXICOLOGY 539, 541 (1988); see also Fisher, supra note 5, at 97, 104-05 (describing the
origins of risk-assessment methodology).
45. COMM. ON THE INSTITUTIONAL MEANS FOR ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO PUB. HEALTH,
COMM'N ON LIFE ScIs., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK ASSESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL

GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROGRESS (the "Red Book") (1983) [hereinafter RED BOOK].
46. Id. at 20, 22-23.
47. Id. at 23-27.
48. Id. at 27-28.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Ultimately, risk assessment is relegated to being a "benefits" input into an overarching
cost-benefit analysis, which constrains agency action very considerably. See THOMAS 0.
MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL

BUREAUCRACY 304-05 (1991).
52. Fisher, supra note 5, at 97, 107 ("The transformation of environmental law into risk
regulation in the US had less to do with the identification of risk as a physical 'reality' and more
with anxieties about the nature and role of the administrative state.").
53. Id. at 106-07 (contending that the analytical tool drove the development of the concept).
54. Applegate, supra note 5, at xiii, xiii-xiv.
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The Red Book structure demonstrates that risk can serve two regulatory
functions: risk-as-hazard acts as the trigger, and risk-as-probability acts as
the standard. Risk-as-hazard creates a potential for extremely wide-ranging
agency action to control inchoate harms, and risk-as-probability applies
constraint by making room for political and policy considerations. Risk-ashazard defines the problem, and risk-as-probability disciplines the response.
This framework is summarized in the following table:
Table 1: Regulatory Functions of Risk
Regulatory Element

Function of Risk

Meaning of Risk

Trigger

Defining the Problem

Risk-as-Hazard

Standard

Disciplining the Response

Risk-as-Probability

C. Definition and Discipline in the Courts
To put the foregoing framework into more concrete terms, the shift from
risk-as-hazard defining the toxics problem to risk-as-probability disciplining
the regulatory response is evident in the transformation of the judicial
approach to toxic harm.
1. Reserve Mining and Ethyl Corp.-The earliest cases on the
regulation of toxic substances emphasized the change wrought by the
antipollution statutes. The congressional response to the inadequacies of tort
law was "precautionary" legislation, embodied in the key term
"endangering," which the courts held was used "in a precautionary or
preventive sense, and, therefore, evidence of potential harm as well as actual
harm comes within the purview of that term., 55 The courts specifically
rejected adoption of the tort standard of "probable" harm.56 Instead, they
embraced risk-as-hazard: "Danger is a risk, and so can only be decided by
assessment of risks., 57 The context makes clear that "assessment of risks" in
these cases does not imply quantitative risk assessment, a term that had not
yet been coined:
Where a statute is precautionary in nature, the evidence difficult to
come by, uncertain, or conflicting because it is on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge, the regulations designed to protect the public
health, and the decision that of an expert administrator,
we will not
58
demand rigorous step-by-step proof of cause and effect.
55. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 17 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (quoting Reserve Mining,
514 F.2d at 528); see also id. at 24-25 (emphasizing the novelty of the problem and the consequent
lack of certainty concerning its effects).
56. Id. at 19.
57. Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA, 514 F.2d 492, 529 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (quoting Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA, 7 ERC (BNA) 1353, 1393 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 28, 1975) (Wright, J., dissenting)).
58. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 28 (footnote omitted).

1374

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 86:1365

The cases contrast "assessment of risks" with deterministic, retrospective
proof of harm.5 9
The existence of a danger in these cases is an open-ended trigger for
regulatory action, and there is no inherent limiting principle. In Reserve
Mining,60 the court ordered the elimination of all asbestos discharges into
Lake Superior because the mere presence of asbestos in drinking water posed
a risk-as-hazard.6 1 In Ethyl Corp., the court clearly recognized that the
appropriateness of agency action (to phase out lead additives in gasoline)
would depend on "a lesser risk of a greater harm [or] a greater risk of a lesser
harm, 62 but offered nothing to define the risk level further. Effective
discipline, in other words, had to come from other sources. In Reserve
Mining, the open-endedness was constrained by the court's own ultimate
control of the injunctive remedy: "We are fortified in this view [of the broad
meaning of 'endangering'] by the flexible provisions for injunctive relief
which permit a court 'to enter such judgment and orders enforcing such
' 63
judgment as the public interest and the equities of the case may require.
In Ethyl Corp., the court relied on the congressional investiture of regulatory
authority in expert agencies as the appropriate constraint on the
governmental response, 64 ultimately supervised by the collaborative
relationship of courts and agencies espoused by the D.C. Circuit in this
period.6 5
2. Benzene.-The Benzene case 6 6 is universally acknowledged to be the
turning point in the judicial approach to the regulation of toxic substances.6 7
The Supreme Court was squarely faced with the difficulties of regulating a

59. Id. at 23.
60. Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d 492.

61. Id. at 529 (stating that the discharge "gives rise to a reasonable medical concern over the
public health").
62. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 18.

63. Reserve Mining, 514 F.2d at 528 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1160(c)(5) (2000)). The Ethyl Corp.
court specifically noted this judicial control. 541 F.2d at 19.
64. Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 17 (stating that the court will not demand rigorous proof of cause
and effect when the regulations are based on "the decision.., of an expert administrator"); see also
Bressman, supra note 36, at 1759 (describing the "expertise model" of administrative law in which
agencies would "deploy science and economics to produce sound policy").
65. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851-52 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(describing the partnerships of agencies and courts in furthering the public interest). Ultimately, the
court suggests, it is a matter of necessity: "Regulators such as the Administrator must be accorded
flexibility, a flexibility that recognizes the special judicial interest in favor of protection of the
health and welfare of people, even in areas where certainty does not exist." Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at
24.
66. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
67. See, e.g., Gail Charnley & E. Donald Elliott, Risk Versus Precaution:Environmental Law

and Public Health Protection, 32 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,363, 10,364 (2002) (noting
that while "the United States has had a long history of applying the precautionary principle in
regulation," it "has moved gradually away from doing so as we learn more about risk assessment
and its underlying scientific basis," and citing Benzene as a turning point).
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nonthreshold carcinogen under a statute whose language implied a binary
model of safety.6 8 The Court's plurality declared that "'safe' is not the
equivalent of 'risk-free,"' 69 and that the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) must predicate its regulations on a well-supported
finding of the existence of a "significant risk."7 ° The Benzene decision
specifically rejected the agency's case for regulation based solely on
evidence of benzene's carcinogenicity, i.e., risk-as-hazard. 7' Instead, the
plurality insisted that the finding of a "significant risk" be based on
preexisting exposure levels, 72 which implicates the dose-response and
exposure assessment elements of risk assessment. Not surprisingly, despite
the plurality's protestations to the contrary, the opinion is universally
understood-based in part on the plurality's own use of numerical risk to
circumscribe the meaning of "significant"73-to require agencies to develop
a system of quantitativerisk assessment.74
For the Benzene plurality, the open-ended nature of risk-as-hazard
represented a danger of governmental overreaching rather than an
opportunity to better protect the public. While Ethyl Corp. emphasized the
expansiveness of agency authority to deal with novel problems, 75 the
Benzene plurality was plainly convinced that OSHA had used its powers
improvidently and needed to be reined in.76 The opinion pointedly (and
otherwise irrelevantly) observed, "As presently formulated, the benzene
standard is an expensive way of providing some additional protection for a
68. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000) ("The
Secretary... shall set the standard which most adequately assures ... that no employee will suffer
material impairment of health or functional capacity.").
69. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 642.
70. Id. at 642-45.
71. Id. at 650 ("This interpretation is at odds with Congress' express recognition of the futility
of trying to make all workplaces totally risk-free."). Specifically, OSHA relied exclusively on
evidence that benzene is a carcinogen (no one seriously doubts that it is) and on its science-based
policy that carcinogens are presumed to present a risk even at the very lowest levels of exposure.
Id. at 652-54. The agency did not, at that point, attempt to prove the degree of the chemical's toxic
potency. Id. at 653.
72. Id. at 642.
73. Id. at 655 (providing an example of how "significant risk" might be calculated using
probability of harm).
74. Fisher, supra note 5, at 97, 105.
75. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc) (defining the task of watchdog
agencies as "to warn us, and protect us, when technological 'advances' present dangers
unappreciated-or unrevealed-by their supporters").
76. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 651-52. The dissenters, echoing the approach of Ethyl Corp.,
advocated reliance on the judgment of the expert agency assigned by Congress for this task, within
the constraints of the legislative standards of "material" injury and "feasible" measures to prevent
such injury. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 689, 695 (Marshall, J., dissenting). This view of the proper
standard was vindicated in the so-called Cotton Dust case the following year. Am. Textile Mfrs.
Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 45 U.S. 490 (1981); see Albert C. Lin, The Unifying Role of Harm in
Environmental Law, 2006 WIS. L. REv. 897, 953 (2006) ("[T]he Benzene decision was extremely
influential in placing the burden of overcoming uncertainty on agencies seeking to impose new
health or environmental standards.").
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relatively small number of employees."' 7 Quantitative risk assessment, then,
served as the plurality's method for disciplining the agency response. The
concurring justices went even further: Justice Powell argued for the
application of a cost-benefit test to constrain the agency, 78 and then-Justice
Rehnquist concluded that the congressional risk-as-hazard standard was so
open-ended as to be unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine.79
3. Gulf South and Corrosion Proof Fittings.-The logical extreme of
using risk-as-probability to discipline the agency response was reached in a
pair of Fifth Circuit cases that subjected agency decisions on toxic substances
to withering judicial scrutiny. In Gulf South,8 ° the court rejected the
Consumer Product Safety Commission's ban on urea-formaldehyde foam
insulation. 8' The court criticized the design of the agency's main study, the
study's applicability to the exposure scenario, and the default assumptions
underlying the resulting risk assessment.82 The judges concluded that the
agency's use of the evidence before it was "not good science., 83 Moreover,
even if the studies were usable, they did not meet the standard of proof that
the court expected
of the agency: "To make precise estimates, precise data
84
are required.,
CorrosionProofFittings85 takes the Gulf South approach still further in
the context of a proposed EPA ban on asbestos.86 The court found in
TSCA's "least burdensome" language a principle that the more stringent the
regulation is, the greater the degree of proof required to justify it.87 Within
this already challenging structure, the court found fault with "the manner in
which the EPA conducted some of its analysis" and "some of the
methodology employed by the EPA in making various of the calculations
that it did perform," criticizing among other things the extent of reliance on
"unquantified benefits" and the degree of reliance on population exposure. 88
The court remanded the asbestos ban, in effect killing it.
Gulf South and Corrosion ProofFittings are unquestionably outliers in
the aggressiveness of their use of risk-as-probability to discipline agency

77. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 628.
78. Id. at 667-71 (Powell, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 687-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
80. GulfS. Insulation v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137 (5th Cir. 1983).
81. Id. at 1139-40.
82. Id. at 1145-48.
83. Id. at 1146.
84. Id. A similarly critical approach was taken in Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization
Corp. v. EPA, a case concerning EPA regulation of second-hand tobacco smoke. 4 F. Supp. 2d 435,
462-63 (M.D.N.C. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002).
85. Corrosion Proof Fittings, Inc. v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991).
86. Corrosion ProofFittings, 947 F.2d 1201.
87. Id. at 1220.
88. Id. at 1216, 1218-19.
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action. 89
However, they do have their defenders, 90 and they have
unquestionably shut down the regulation of toxic chemicals under the
Consumer Product Safety Act and TSCA. 91 They exemplify both the
transition from an open-ended, risk-as-hazard approach to the problem of
chemical regulation, in which risk broadly defines the problem and acts as
the trigger for regulatory action, to a far more constrained approach that is
characterized by risk-as-probability
serving as the standard that disciplines
92
the agency's response.
III. Risk and the Data Gap
The transformation of the legal approach to toxics from an open-ended
risk-as-hazard trigger to a constrained risk-as-probability standard has major
consequences for the information needs of the regulatory system for
chemicals. Risk-as-probability requires that regulatory action be supported
by extensive amounts of toxicity and exposure information-information that
simply does not exist. This data gap must be remedied if a program of
chemical regulation is to be effective.
A.

Risk-Based Regulation and Information Demands
As we have seen, the Red Book divides the risk-analysis process into the
objective, scientific "risk assessment" phase, and the judgmental, policyoriented "risk management" phase.93 Risk assessment consists of two main

89. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification ofRulemaking: A Response
to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 525, 547-49, 557 (1997) (criticizing the Corrosion
ProofFitting court's rejection of EPA's methodologies as ill-informed, and noting that while such
examples of judicial overreaching may be rare, they are problematic and contribute to the
ossification of rulemaking).
90. See, e.g, Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, "More Good Than Harm ": A First
Principle for Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379, 415-18
(1993) (praising the CorrosionProofFittingscourt for using an approach that "effectively turned on
whether specific choices made by EPA would accomplish more good than harm").
91. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Professor Sunstein's Fuzzy Math, 90 GEO. L.J. 2341, 2343
(2002) (citing the use of cost-benefit analysis, which Corrosion Proof Fittings requires, as the
likely reason that "EPA... has not taken any significant action to limit exposure to toxic chemicals
under TSCA").
92. The cases also reflect several other developments, such as statutes evolving as
understanding of toxic injury increased, and judicial attitudes toward agencies and environmental
regulation moving from eager support to downright hostility.
93. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. The National Academies have subsequently
recognized that the sharp distinction in the Red Book framework is untenable, and that policy and
judgment are inevitable parts of the assessment process. See generally COMM. ON RISK-BASED
APPROACHES FOR DISPOSITION OF TRANSURANIC AND HIGH-LEVEL RADIO-ACTIVE WASTE,
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, RISK AND DECISIONS ABOUT DISPOSITION OF TRANSURANIC AND
HIGH-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE, at ix-x (2005) (examining different types of radioactive-waste
sites and "endors[ing] a risk-informed approach for addressing their disposition"); COMM. ON RISK
ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND
JUDGMENT IN RISK ASSESSMENT 17-18 (1994) (investigating "whether EPA's risk-assessment
methods [of air pollutants] express in a scientifically supportable way the risks posed by a

1378

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 86:1365

elements: the toxic potency (dose response) of a chemical that has been
identified as causing harm, and the level of exposure to the chemical.9 4 Both
elements are capable of quantitative expression, and quantification is
expected. While the basic risk equation (toxicity x exposure = risk) is
simple, its components are extremely complex phenomena. 95 The data needs
of the first step, hazard identification, are by far the least burdensome
because they are limited to determining whether the substance has the
capacity to cause a particular disease, typically cancer. 96 Dose-response
testing requires far more extensive and expensive studies, 97 and the
uncertainties are, in fact, magnified in such studies because of the need to
extrapolate detailed toxicological information from animal test results.
The uncertainty encountered on the toxicity side of the risk equation has
been described as "knowledge uncertainty," because it is mainly based on the
98
lack of a thorough understanding of the underlying mechanisms of cancer.
The uncertainties associated with the exposure side represent "information

substance[,]... whether EPA's methods are consistent with current scientific knowledge
[, and] ... whether EPA's methods give policy-makers and the public the information they need to
make judgments about risk management"); COMM. ON RISK CHARACTERIZATION, NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

1-2 (Paul C. Stem & Harvey V. Fineberg eds., 1996) (proposing a reconception of "risk
characterization in order to increase the likelihood of achieving sound and acceptable decisions" by
implementing "a process in which the characterization of risk emerges from a combination of
analysis and deliberation").
94. RED BOOK, supra note 45, at 3.
95. See Applegate, supra note 22, at 284-89 ("Each stage of the regulatory process produces a
deficit between the amount of information needed for regulatory decision making and the amount
that is available. This data gap is wide and expandmg."(footnote omitted)); Mary L. Lyndon,
Information Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87
MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1812 (1989) (noting that epidemiological studies are very costly and that
"epidemiological data suffer from many confounding factors" and are "of limited sensitivity");
Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Faihreof Environmental Law to Produce Needed
Information on Health and the Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619, 1625-30 (2004) ("Virtually every
prominent expert panel convened to consider the effects of industrial activities on health and the
environment expresses alarm at the dearth of research and basic information." (footnotes omitted)).
96. See Lyndon, supra note 95, at 1801, 1802 (noting that toxicity and exposure data are
accumulating).
97. The European Union's REACH proposal for chemical regulation estimated the cost of
testing at £1.25 billion. Commission Staff Working Paper,Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restrictions of
Chemicals (REACH), Establishing a European Chemicals Agency and Amending Directive
1999/45/EC and Regulation (EC) (on Persistent OrganicPollutants), Extended Impact Assessment,
at 13 tbl.4, COM (2003) 644 final (Oct. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Working Paper on REACH],
available at

http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/reach/docs/reach/eia-sec-2003-1171.pdf.

In

contrast, the cost for the Screening Information Data Set (SIDS) battery of tests is estimated by EPA
to be a relatively modest $205,000. OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION
CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA AVAILABILITY STUDY: WHAT Do WE REALLY
SAFETY OF HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME CHEMICALS?, at app. III tbl.8
CHEMICAL
HAZARD DATA AVAILABILITY
STUDY],
available at

AND TOXICS, EPA,
KNOW ABOUT THE
(1998) [hereinafter
http://www.epa.gov/

hpv/pubs/general/hazchem.pdf.
98. Howard A. Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal
DecisionmakingUnder Uncertainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339, 356-57 (1982).
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uncertainty," because the problem is less one of understanding than of the
sheer extent of the data needs. 99 Exposure assessment requires the risk
assessor to measure or estimate the concentrations of a chemical from the
source or sources from which it is initially introduced into the environment
through the relevant pathway or pathways (including air, water, groundwater,
soil, sediment), to the target organism through the relevant route or routes of
exposure (including ingestion, inhalation, dermal absorption). 00
The
problem of filling the data needs of the elements of quantitative risk
assessment is exacerbated by important qualitative aspects of the analysis.' 0'
Given the expectation of quantification that is implicit in Benzene and
explicit in the Red Book, the scientific norms of certainty, precision, and
comprehensiveness are woven into the fabric of the inquiry. More generally,
science has an undeniable cultural and political attraction in justifying
expensive regulation. 10 2 Thus, the Gulf South court stated, "To make precise
estimates, precise data are required" 03-even though there is no inherent
reason why we should value precision or pinpoint accuracy in the regulation
of public health and the environment. The Ethyl Corp. court more
realistically observed: "[C]ertainty in the complexities of environmental
medicine may be achievable only after the fact, when scientists have the
opportunity for leisurely and isolated scrutiny of an entire mechanism.
Awaiting certainty will often allow for only reactive, not preventive,
regulation. ' 04 In fact, certainty and precision are simply not available from

the risk assessment techniques or the current state of the sciences behind
them.'05
To make informational matters worse, the risk-as-probability approach
was encouraged by, and in turn facilitated, the approach to regulation that
06
Professor McGarity has called "comprehensive analytical rationality."',

99. Id.
100. EPA, What is an Exposure Assessment?, http://epa.gov/oppt/exposure/pubs/exposurep.htm
(last updated Sept. 6, 2007).
101. See generally THOMAS 0. MCGARITY ET AL., SOPHISTICATED SABOTAGE: THE
INTELLECTUAL GAMES USED TO SUBVERT RESPONSIBLE REGULATION 5 (2004) (criticizing "the
disingenuous assumptions, suspicious numbers, and fallacious inferences of quantitative risk
assessment, cost-benefit analysis, and other analytic tools").
102. See Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms
and Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 385-88 (1993) (arguing that
environmental policy can degenerate into a debate over science versus politics); Wendy E. Wagner,
The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 1617 (1995) (asserting
that past scientific regulatory strategies have failed because agencies exaggerate the impact of
science to avoid political accountability for their decisions).
103. Gulf S. Insulation v. U.S. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137, 1146 (5th Cir.
1983).
104. Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 25 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc).
105. Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 119,
173 (2003).
106. MCGARITY, supra note 51, at 5; see also SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 5, at 10-11
(describing the goals and legislative success of comprehensive-rationality proponents and how those
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Comprehensive rationality and all so-called rational-choice methodologies
aspire to gather and systematically analyze all relevant data about a problem
and its potential solutions in an effort to determine the optimal regulatory
response.10 7 Thus, in addition to the full battery of chemical information
already described, the risk-as-probability model serves the enterprise of
determining all of the costs, benefits, and other consequences of a proposed
regulatory initiative and of alternative measures. These efforts not only have
their own information demands and uncertainties, but they place additional
back-end pressure on the scientific data to be complete and precise, because
the data provide10 8the quantitative foundation for the benefits side of costbenefit analysis.
In sum, the use of risk-as-probability to discipline regulatory responses
demands the acquisition of highly sophisticated scientific information that is
neither readily available nor easily and cheaply obtained; some is at the
frontiers of scientific knowledge, and some is at the outer limits of the
practical ability to collect adequate amounts. 10 9 Risk-as-probability commits
the regulator to an extraordinarily expensive and time-consuming analytical
effort to justify restrictions on chemicals.
B. Documenting the Data Gap
It seems intuitive that a substantial data gap would follow from the
foregoing analysis because it is hard to imagine how the regulatory system
could supply all of the information that the risk-as-probability approach
demands. Indeed, lack of chemical information was one of the principal
reasons for enactment of TSCA in 1976; l l0 the problem had been identified

goals conflict with traditional risk regulation); Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in
Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REV. 393, 396-401 (1981) (contrasting the policy-making
approaches of comprehensive rationality and incrementalism); Hornstein, supra note 102, at 386-87
(explaining that the current desire for synopticism in environmental law does not coincide with a
corresponding enthusiasm for comprehensive rationality).
107. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Christopher H. Schroeder, Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: A
Pragmatic Reorientation, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1087796 (describing positivism and rational choice in social science and
regulation). This approach was applied in Corrosion ProofFittings, Inc. v. EPA, in which the court
required EPA to analyze thoroughly the costs and benefits, not only of its preferred approach, but
also of the several alternative approaches that it did or should have considered. 947 F.2d 1201,
1217 (5th Cir. 1991).
108. MCGARITY, supra note 51, at 59-60; see SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 5, at 15859 (explaining that risk regulation has superior flexibility because it allows for back-end
adjustments).
109. See generally Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information
Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 1409 (2008) (describing the informationgathering difficulties faced by regulatory agencies, such as asymmetric information, incomplete
baseline information, inadequate baselines, and sheer complexity due to nonlinearity and stochastic
real-world events).
110. Toxic Substances Control Act, Pub. L. No. 94-469, § 2(b)(1), 90 Stat. 2003 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2000)) ("It is the policy of the United States that.., adequate
data should be developed with respect to the effect of chemical substances and mixtures on health
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by the CEQ as early as 1971.'
The data gap has been verified in numerous
12
studies."
empirical
In 1984, the National Research Council systematically examined the
available data in a report, Toxicity Testing.13 Sampling the universe of
commercial chemicals over a range of uses and production volumes, the
panel found that no toxicity testing was available for more than 80% of all
toxic substances in commerce, and that only 22% of high production volume
(HPV) chemicals had even a minimum data set available."14 As this chart
summarizing the Toxicity Testing results shows, there is a consistent data gap
across all5 categories of industrial chemicals, regardless of production
volume. 1
Table 2: Summary of Toxicity Testing Results
Estimated Mean Percent in Selected Universe
I

Pesbcdes & Ingredients -

3350

-

Cosmetic Ingredients - 3410

Drugs & Excipients - 1815

-

Food Additives - 8627

Chemicals
(>IM Ib/yr) 12860

Chemicals (vIM Iblyr) - 3911

"

Chemicals (unknown) - 752

.

0

20

40

60

80

E Complete Hazard Assessment Possible

22Partial Hazard Assessment Possible

NMinimal Information Available

WSome Toxicity Information Available

100

0 No Toxicity Information Available

and the environment and that the development of such data should be the responsibility of those
who manufacture and those who process such chemical substances and mixtures.").
111. TOxIC SUBSTANCES, supra note 20, at 783.
112. See JOHN S. APPLEGATE & KATHERINE BAER, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, WHITE
PAPER NO. 602, STRATEGIES FOR CLOSING THE CHEMICAL DATA GAP 2-5 (2006), available at

http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/Closing-Data-Gaps-602.pdf
(discussing numerous
studies that revealed insufficient information for the proper regulation of toxic chemicals).
113. STEERING COMM. ON IDENTIFICATION OF TOXIC AND POTENTIALLY TOxIC CHEMICALS
FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE NAT'L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
TOXICITY TESTING: STRATEGIES TO DETERMINE NEEDS AND PRIORITIES (1984) [hereinafter
TOXICITY TESTING].

114. Id. at 12.
115. APPLEGATE ET AL., supra note 40, at 67 (citing TOXICITY TESTING, supra note 113, at 12).
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The situation has changed little since 1984. Using the baseline
Screening Information Data Set (SIDS) for chemicals, 16 the Environmental
Defense Fund (now Environmental Defense) published a study in 1997,
Toxic Ignorance, 1 7 which found that full SIDS data were publicly available
for only 29% of the 100 HPV chemicals (greater than 1,000,000 lbs/year) in
their sample." 8 Conversely, none or only part of the SIDS mammaliantoxicity data set was publicly available for 71% of the sample." 9 In
response, the Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA, now American
Chemistry Council) undertook its own study. The similarities in results are
more striking than the differences. CMA concluded that complete SIDS data
exist for 47% of chemicals, 120 though others have read the study to show that
only 6% of HPV chemicals have publicly available data for all SIDS
elements.'12 In an effort to sort this out, EPA undertook its own study of
approximately 3,000 HPV chemicals. The agency summarized its findings:
"[N]o basic toxicity information... is publicly available for 43% of the high
volume chemicals manufactured in the US and a full set of basic toxicity
information is available for only 7% of these chemicals."' 122 A more recent
study of EPA's own Integrated Risk Information System (IRIS) by the
Center for Progressive Reform' 23 found major gaps and outdated information
in this database on a wide range of chemicals regulated under EPA's
24
And some areas, such as children's health, are in even worse
statutes.'
25
1
shape.

116. The SIDS was developed in 1989 by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) to encourage the chemical industry voluntarily to develop "base level test
information on approximately 600 poorly characterized international HPV chemicals." OECD
SIDS Program: Chemical Information Collection and Data Development (Testing),
http://www.epa.gov/oppt/chemtest/pubs/oecdsids.htm (last updated Mar. 18, 2008). It consists of a
battery of risk-related tests that would (if completed) enable a basic analysis of a chemical's toxic
potential for acute toxicity, chronic toxicity, developmental and reproductive toxicity, mutagemcity
(a key indicator of carcinogenicity), ecotoxicity, and environmental fate. See generally ORG. FOR
ECON. COOPERATION SECRETARIAT, MANUAL FOR INVESTIGATION OF HPV CHEMICALS:
CHAPTER 5: PREPARATION OF THE SIDS INITIAL ASSESSMENT REPORT (SIAR) AND SIDS PROFILE

(2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/l 3/14/36045229.pdf (describing the information
that should go into a SIDS profile and its useful purposes).
117. ENVTL. DEF. FUND, TOXIC IGNORANCE: THE CONTINUING ABSENCE OF BASIC HEALTH
TESTING FOR ToP-SELLING CHEMICALS IN THE UNITED STATES (1997), available at

http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/243_toxicignorance.pdf.
118. Id.at 15.
119. Id.
120. CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA AVAILABILITY STUDY, supra note 97, at 4.

121. David Roe, Toxic Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed Facts, 32 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,232, 10,237 (2002) (interpreting the CMA study and claiming that 94% of
HPV chemicals do not have publicly available data for all SIDS elements).
122. CHEMICAL HAZARD DATA AVAILABILITY STUDY, supra note 97, at 2.

123. The author is a member of the board of the Center for Progressive Reform, an organization
that advocates regulatory action to protect health, safety, and the environment.
124. See RENA I. STEINZOR ET AL., CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, WHITE PAPER NO. 510,
OVERCOMING "ENVIRONMENTAL DATA GAPS": WHY WHAT EPA DOESN'T KNOW ABOUT TOXIC
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The European Commission sponsored several studies of the data gap in
preparing its legislative proposal for REACH, a complete overhaul of the
European Union's chemical regulation system. 126 The absence of chemical
information was a major motivation for the overhaul, 127 just as it had been
128
thirty years earlier with TSCA (plus qa change, plus c 'est la mgme chose).
One such study concluded that publicly available base data existed for only
14% of the HPV chemicals studied, less than a base set existed for 65%, and
no data existed for 21%. 129 Another European study found a similar pattern
metric
(17-22%) across a range of production amounts, from 10 to over 1000 131
tons per year, 130 and yet another reached conclusions similar to EPA's.
It is particularly noteworthy that virtually all of the foregoing results
actually understate the data gap in three crucial ways. First, most rely on the
SIDS data, which are limited and focus on hazard identification (risk-ashazard). Second, the SIDS data leave the exposure side almost entirely
unaddressed. The SIDS data are thus by no means sufficient for a defensible
quantitative risk assessment that would form the basis for a determination of
risk-as-probability. Third, the studies focus on HPV chemicals, which are
not only a small portion of all chemicals, but are also the ones about which
one might expect the greatest amount of data to exist. The existence and
severity of the chemical information data gap must therefore be taken as
firmly established.

CHEMICALS CAN HURT 8-10 (2005), available at http://www.progressivereform.org/
articles/DataGaps_5 10.pdf (offering criticisms of IRIS).
125. See generally Wendy Wagner & Lynn Blais, Children's Health and Environmental
Exposure Risks: Information Gaps, Scientific Uncertainty, and Regulatory Reform, 17 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 249 (2007) (identifying shortcomings in current informational levels and
information-gathering processes as related to children's health, and suggesting possible reforms).
126. See generally John S. Applegate, Synthesizing TSCA and REACH. PracticalPrinciplesfor
Chemical Regulation Reform, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. (forthcoming 2008) (on file with the Texas Law
Review) (describing the origins, purposes, and basic provisions of REACH).
127. Commission White Paperon Strategyfor a Future Chemicals Policy, at 6, COM (2001) 88
final (Feb. 27, 2001) [hereinafter Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2001:0088:FIN:EN:PDF.
128. APPLEGATE & BAER, supra note 112, at 1.
129. European Comm'n Joint Research Ctr., Inst. for Health and Consumer Prot., European
Chem. Bureau, Public Availability of Data on EU High Production Volume Chemicals, 1, EUR
18996 EN (1999) (prepared by Remi Allanou et al.), available at http://ecb.jrc.it/DOCUMENTS/
ExistingChemicals/PUBLlCAVAILABILITYOFDATA/datavail.pdf.
130. RPA & STATISTICS SWEDEN, ASSESSMENT OF THE BUSINESS IMPACT OF NEW
REGULATIONS IN THE CHEMICALS SECTOR 70 (2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/

enterpnse/reach/docs/whitepaper/bia-report-2002_06.pdf.
131. See Working Paper on REACH, supra note 97, at 26-27 (noting that dose-response
information is "unavailable for a significant percentage of the chemical substances on the European
market"). These results and others were collected in a general assessment of testing needs.
European Comm'n Joint Research Ctr., Inst. for Health and Consumer Prot., Assessment of
Additional Testing Needs Under REACH: Effects of (Q)SARS, Risk Based Testing and Voluntary
Industry Initiatives (Sept. 2003) (prepared by Finn Pederson et al.) [hereinafter Pederson et al.],
availableat http://ihcp.jrc.cec.eu.int/docs/ecb/reach-testing-needs.pdf.
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C. Managingthe Data Gap
1. Supply and Demand.-As the foregoing discussion demonstrates,
different regulatory triggers and standards create different levels of demand
for chemical information. Regardless of who has the burden of generating
the information, risk-as-probability clearly demands a far broader range and
detail of chemical data than risk-as-hazard. 32 Systems that abjure risk
entirely-technology-based regulation or pollution taxes, for examplecreate different and less onerous sets of demands.
Conversely, a regulatory system operates in an environment that has a
preexisting supply of chemical information. Some information is naturally
created through the obvious incentive for the manufacturer of an industrial
chemical to have some basic knowledge of its useful and acutely hazardous
properties. However, the natural incentive only takes one so far in supplying
chemical information. Hazard information has negative liability, regulatory,
and economic consequences, 133 while remaining in ignorance has few
negative consequences because long latency, nonsignature health effects, and
diffuseness and rarity of effect make it difficult to trace health effects to their
13 4
A major function of regulation, therefore, is to increase the
sources.
supply of information, and the informational requirements of a regulatory
system have a profound effect on supply.
Ideally, the demand and supply of information are more or less in
equilibrium. A system that is generating more information than it needs to
make decisions is probably inefficient, unless there are secondary uses for
the information. A system that generates less than it needs will not be able to
effectively perform its protective function.' 35 The former is not a common

132. Of course, the nature of the burden does have a great deal to do with how well the
demands will be met and what happens if they are not met, a point to which we will return in
subpart IV(B).
133. See, e.g., Lyndon, supra note 95, at 1817 ("Potential liability is therefore another influence
that discourages manufacturers from producing [chemical] information."); Wendy E. Wagner,
Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 773, 785, 788-89
(1997) (noting the drawbacks for manufacturers of investing in testing or voluntarily reporting
hazard information).
134. See, e.g., Applegate, supra note 22, at 264-66, 272 (explaining the difficulty of proving
toxic effects because of the uncertainties related to latency, rarity of effect, and the possibility of
other causes); Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the InformationAge, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
115, 132-34 (2004) (discussing the difficulties in identifying environmental harms, linking such
harms to particular individuals, and determining how such pollution affects those individuals);
Lyndon, supra note 95, at 1813-14 (contending that, given the difficulties consumers face in
screening products for toxicity, ignorance of toxicity may in fact be an advantage to a product
compared to those that have been shown to have some toxic effect); Wagner, supra note 133, at 784
(observing that delay between exposure and injury, low probability of harm, and the inability of
customers to trace effects back to the manufacturer provide little incentive for testing a product's
safety).
135. John S. Applegate & Robert L. Fischman, Missing Information: The Scientific Data Gap
in Conservation and Chemical Regulation, 83 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 6, on file
with the Texas Law Review).

2008]

Bridging the Data Gap

1385

problem; the latter is. As Professor Karkkainen explains in his contribution
to this Symposium, information demands can be debilitating to agencies,
resulting in underproduction of regulation, too-late regulation, and outdated
regulations.' 36 By adopting risk-as-probability as the regulatory standard for
disciplining the response, the chemical regulatory system has created a high
demand for chemical information. Professor Houck's description cannot be
improved upon: risk-based standards "eat up heroic amounts of money,
remain information-starved, feature shameless manipulation of the data, face
crippling political pressure, and produce little abatement."' 137 The data gap
documented above is clear evidence of a substantial and system-wide
disequilibrium in which the demands of regulation for chemical information
far outstrip the supply.
2. Bridging and Filling.-Perhaps a more vivid way to picture the
difference between supply and demand is to translate it into the data gap
metaphor. 38 A gap can be filled or it can be bridged. A filling strategy
increases supply. It acknowledges the lack of adequate data, but insists on
the need to acquire such data before regulating. It is, in this sense, the logical
consequence of the risk-as-probability approach to regulation, and in
particular, of the quantitative character of that approach. A bridging strategy
takes the opposite tack. Acknowledging the lack of adequate data for a full
analysis of (especially) risk-as-probability, it adopts regulatory techniquestriggers, standards, and procedures-that do not require as much information.
Instead of increasing supply, bridging reduces demand.
IV. Harnessing the Demand for Information
Deliberately or not, regulatory systems deploy techniques that either
redress or exacerbate the imbalance of demand and supply of chemical
information. The default strategy for chemical regulation, as one might
expect, is to fill in missing data and adopt regulatory techniques accordingly.
This Part of the Article begins with a discussion of the baseline filling
strategy. We next consider more effective filling techniques. Even with
significant improvements, however, the filling strategy has inherent
limitations. The Article therefore concludes by describing several alternative
techniques that are based instead on a bridging strategy.
A. Filling Strategies: The Supply-Side Baseline
A rational regulatory system is built on information about the external
world, and accordingly the natural impulse of any such system is to supply
136. Karkkainen, supra note 109, at 1412.
137. Oliver A. Houck, Tales from a Troubled Marriage: Science and Law in Environmental
Policy, 17 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 163, 172 (2003).
138. See Applegate & Fischman, supra note 135 (manuscript at 4-12) (contending that a
regulatory system that demands more information than it supplies faces a data gap).
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missing data. TSCA epitomizes the filling approach to regulation that is
associated with risk-as-probability.13 9 TSCA's statement of policy commits
both regulators and the regulated industry to a comprehensive examination of
the risks and costs of the use of a chemical 40 and to the development of
"adequate data ... with respect to the effect of chemical substances and
141

mixtures on health and the environment."'
The demand side of TSCA's balance is substantial in several respects.42
Congress did not reject all risk, but only "unreasonable" risk.
Unreasonable risk was expressly understood to be a level of risk above
zero, 143 to be set by consideration of the probability of harm and the costs of
regulation. 144
Other requirements, such as adopting the "least
burdensome"'' 45 restrictions, have been read to demand a detailed costbenefit analysis of numerous potential levels of regulation, with the most
severe restrictions requiring the strongest justification. 146 Procedurally,
TSCA requires that a rule be accompanied by "a statement with respect to"
the human and environmental risks of the chemical, the benefits and
available substitutes for the chemical, and "the reasonably ascertainable
economic consequences of the rule."' 147 More importantly, the adoption of
the "substantial evidence" standard of judicial review was intended by
Congress to signal a more skeptical and searching review, 148 which
intensifies the agency's need to generate large amounts of data in support of
its actions. The extreme case is CorrosionProofFittings, in which the court
deemed EPA's ten years of study and over one hundred studies of the effects
of asbestos to be 149
insufficient to support the restrictions that the agency had
sought to impose.

139. See generally Applegate, supra note 126 (explaining that the process of determining levels
of nsk requires a high degree of scientific knowledge); Applegate, supra note 22, at 271-77
(describing the characteristics of the unreasonable risk standard).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2)-(3) (2000).
141. Id. § 2601(b)(1).
142. Id § 2601(b)(2)-(3).
143. H.R. REP. No. 94-1341, at 14-15 (1976), reprinted in ENV'T AND NATURAL RES. POL'Y
Div., LIBRARY OF CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE Toxic SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 407,

422-23 (1976); Applegate, supra note 22, at 273-77.
144. S.REP. No. 94-698, at 20 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4510; H.R. REP.
NO. 94-1341, at 421-22, 442.
145. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a).
146. Corrosion Proof Fittings, Inc. v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1216 (5th Cir. 1991) ("By choosing
the harshest remedy given to it under TSCA, EPA assigned to itself the toughest burden in
satisfying TSCA's requirement that its alternative be the least burdensome of all those offered to
it.").
147. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1).
148. H.R. REP. No. 94-1679, at 55, 96 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4539, 4581.
149. 947 F.2d at 1207-08.
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While TSCA's statement of policy indicates that Congress sought to
balance the demand and supply of chemical information,150 in fact, the
techniques for generating "adequate data" are woefully inadequate to the
task. 151 For new chemicals, TSCA adopted the relatively toothless
premanufacture-notice (PMN) procedure. 52 PMN requires just thatnotification-and gives EPA only a brief window to request more
information. 153 According to the Agency itself, "There is no defined base
data set required before PMN, and TSCA does not require prior testing of
new chemicals. Consequently, less than half of the PMNs submitted include
toxicological data.' ' 154 The Governmental Accountability Office (GAO)
concluded that "EPA lacks sufficient data to ensure ' that
potential health and
155
environmental risks of new chemicals are identified."
For existing chemicals, TSCA's data-gathering system is equally
limited. EPA can require manufacturers to submit a variety of existing
environmental and health-effects data, but it encounters several procedural
and definitional barriers in the statute itself. 56 EPA also has the authority to
require manufacturers to test existing chemicals, 157 but in each case EPA
must first make several formal findings that are subject to judicial review
under the demanding "substantial evidence" standard. 58 GAO concludes,
"EPA does not routinely assess existing chemicals, has limited information

150. See supra text accompanying notes 139-40.
151. See Applegate, supra note 126 (manuscript at 12-15) (chronicling the difficulty in filling
data gaps under TSCA).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1)(A).
153. See id. § 2604(a)(1) (requiring notice at least ninety days prior to manufacturing or
processing a new substance).
154. EPA, Assessing Risk, New Chemicals Program, http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/newchems/
pubs/assess.htm (last updated Sept. 28, 2007). EPA relies instead on similarities in structure to
chemicals with known toxicity ("structure-activity relationships") to screen most chemicals. Id.
155. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-458, CHEMICAL REGULATIONOPTIONS EXIST TO IMPROVE EPA'S ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND MANAGE ITS
CHEMICAL REVIEW PROGRAM 10 (2005) [hereinafter CHEMICAL REGULATION], available at

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05458.pdf.
156. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)-(c) (authorizing the Administrator to require the submission of data
from chemical manufacturers and imposing limits on this authority).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 2603. For a detailed discussion of the test rules, see Applegate, supra note 22,
at 315-30.
158. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(b)-(c). The legislative history confirms the congressional intention "that
the reviewing court engage in a searching review of the Administrator's reasons and explanations
for the Administrator's conclusions." H.R. REP. NO. 94-1341, at 55-56 (1976), reprinted in ENV'T
AND NATURAL RES. POL'Y Div., LIBRARY OF CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE TOXIC
SUBSTANCES CONTROL ACT 407, 463; see also S. REP. No. 94-698, at 13, 16, 20 (1976), reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4491, 4503, 4506, 4510 (describing the process by which the Administrator
reviews any submissions made by parties in response to orders issued by the Administrator); H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1679, at 55, 96 (1976) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4539, 4581
(describing how the courts must set aside any rule not supported by substantial evidence in the
rulemaking record as a whole).
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on their health and environmental risks, and has issued few regulations
controlling such chemicals."' 5 9
In fact, TSCA represents not only the supply-side baseline, but also the
worst case. Not only does it adopt a filling strategy, it places the burden of
proof squarely on the government to prove unsafety, that is, to do the filling.
Thus, it creates almost no new incentives, other than the purely hortatory, for
the private sector to develop chemical information beyond preexisting
liability considerations. 160 The effect of this allocation of the burden is
intensified by the requirements that EPA make certain specific findings on
toxicity, the adequacy of other federal laws, and alternative regulatory
approaches'61
6-all of which are subject to "substantial evidence" judicial
review.162 This burden has been read aggressively by the courts that have
reviewed TSCA cases. 163 Moreover, EPA must go through an elaborate
hearing process that64 includes oral testimony by interested parties and even
cross-examination.1
Professors McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast have observed, "Because
industries possess much of the information relevant to regulatory decisions,
elaborate processes give them more power by increasing the importance of
that information."'' 65 As they predicted, EPA has never taken a great deal of
mandatory action under TSCA. 166 The agency has promulgated only five
chemical bans since 1976 (thirty-two years ago), 167 and Corrosion Proof

159. CHEMICAL REGULATION, supra note 155, at 18; see also RICHARD A. DENISON, NOT
THAT INNOCENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN, EUROPEAN UNION, AND UNITED

STATES POLICIES ON INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS, at IV-1 to IV-2 (2007), available at http:/www.
environmentaldefense.org/documents/6149_NotThatlnnocentFullreport.pdf (discussing the limited
data available to EPA in the premanufacture-notice process).
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) ("[T]he development of such data should be the responsibility
of those who manufacture and those who process such chemical substances and mixtures."). For a
dissenting view, see James W. Conrad Jr., Open Secrets: The Widespread Availability of
Information about the Health and EnvironmentalEffects of Chemicals, 69 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
141, 143-44 & n.10 (2006) (arguing that EPA has broad power to compel chemical manufacturers
to conduct tests and submit data regarding a chemical's toxicity).
161. See 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c) (listing a bevy of requirements that the Administrator must satisfy
before promulgating any new rules).
162. Id. § 2618(b)-(c).
163. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings, Inc. v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1207 (5th Cir. 1991)
(striking down an EPA rule promulgated under TSCA because it was not supported by substantial
evidence, see supra text accompanying notes 84-88).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(3). The procedures are specially called out as subject to enforcement
by judicial review. Id. § 2618(c)(1)(B).
165. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process,
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control ofAgencies, 75 VA. L.
REV. 431, 469 (1989); see also Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of PoliticalControl, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 268-69 (1987) (using TSCA to illustrate
the point that placing the burden of proof on the agency hinders its ability to regulate).
166. CHEMICAL REGULATION, supra note 155, at 27-29.
167. Id.at 18.
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Fittings effectively put an end even to that in 1991.168 As long as the burden
remains on the government, regulation will be limited by governmental

resources and will be subject to demands for ever more information in
judicial (Corrosion ProofFittings) or political ("sound science" rhetoric' 69)
forums. The result is a regulatory system 70that only addresses easy cases and
relies primarily on voluntary compliance.
B. Better FillingStrategies: Supply-Side Improvements
The problem with the TSCA filling strategy is familiar and widely, if
not universally, acknowledged. There is a considerable literature that seeks
to address the problem by attending to the supply side, that is, by developing
better filling strategies.
1. Licensing: FIFRA and REACH.-The most effective way to increase
the supply of chemical data is to place the burden of proving safety on the
proponent of a product or activity, as opposed to placing the burden of
Licensing is a relatively unusual
proving unsafety on the regulator.
technique in environmental law, but it is deployed in FIFRA, 17 1 the federal
FIFRA requires manufacturers of pesticides to
pesticide statute. 172
demonstrate that a pesticide "will perform its intended function without

unreasonable adverse effects on the environment,"'

73

a standard that, like

TSCA's "unreasonable risk" formulation, takes into account risk and
"economic, social, and environmental costs and benefits."' 174 Not only does
168. See McGanty, supra note 91, at 2343 (identifying the cost-benefit analysis requirement of
Corrosion ProofFittings as the likely reason for EPA's inaction).
169. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science Is Sound Science and Their Science Is Junk
Science: Science-Based Strategies for Avoiding Accountability and Responsibility for RiskProducingProducts and Activities, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 897, 904-08 (2004) (detailing the tobacco
industry's science-based strategy for avoiding accountability by attacking EPA science as unsound).
170. See EPA, TSCA Chemical Testing Program Objectives, www.epa.gov/oppt/chemtest/
pubs/vision.htm (last updated Mar. 18, 2008) (making it an organizational goal to "[r]edefine
success by recognizing" both mandatory and voluntary testing programs "to fill identified data
needs").
171. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (2000).
172. See Applegate, supra note 22, at 308-12 (describing the advantages and disadvantages of
environmental licensing and specific examples of such licensing, including FIFRA). This strategy
also undergirds the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2000).
NEPA is unquestionably a "filling" statute, in that it is extremely demanding of data on the
See Bradley C. Karkkainen,
environmental impacts of a proposed major federal action.
Information-ForcingEnvironmental Regulation, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 861, 879 (2006) (describing
NEPA's environmental impact statements as "encyclopedic compendi[a] of expected impacts and
alternatives that a federal agency must produce before undertaking any action that significantly
affects the environment"). By casting the burden of providing the information on the proponent of a
project, it creates a powerful incentive to produce the relevant information in situations where the
proponent believes that the project has particularly compelling benefits, including economic
benefits.
173. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(C).
174. Id. § 136(bb); see also Applegate, supra note 22, at 267-77 (discussing the nature of the
"unreasonable risk" standard).
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pesticide registration require registrants to provide a battery of safety and use
data to support the claims made for it, but FIFRA also creates a powerful
legal device, the "data call-in," for demanding data on existing products
without any prerequisites or even recourse. 175 The Toxicity Testing study
demonstrates the effectiveness of this approach: there is a marked difference
between the data available for chemicals subject to licensing (such as
176
pesticides, foods, drugs, and cosmetics) and other industrial chemicals.
Licensing does not by any means reduce the demand for chemical
information-FIFRA is just as much a filling statute as TSCA-but it does a
better job of supplying the information.
More recently, the European Union adopted a new chemical regulatory
regime, known as REACH. 177 Judging TSCA to be a cautionary tale of how
not to regulate chemicals effectively, the EU designed REACH to be in many
ways the anti-TSCA.178 The most dramatic divergence from TSCA is the
aggressive commitment to generating data on existing chemicals, 179 and the
primary means for doing this is a registration procedure. 8 ° REACH's
' 8
objective is to move from "no data, no problem" to "no data, no market."' '
Registration is primarily an information-provision process, with the addition
of a chemical-safety assessment for chemicals produced in quantities over
ten metric tons. 18 REACH sets out very deliberately to eliminate the
common difference between the information supporting new and existing
chemicals by implementing "a step by step process to address the 'burden of
the past' and develop adequate knowledge for existing substances that
industry wants to continue marketing."1 83 Finally, in order to avoid a
massive increase in animal testing, REACH encourages the development of
nonvertebrate testing mechanisms (such as structure-activity relationships
84
between chemicals) to be an adequate basis for regulatory action.

175. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2); see also Applegate, supra note 22, at 312-18 (discussing and
contrasting FIFRA's "data call-in" with the TSCA).
176. See supra Table 2 accompanying note 115.
177. Council Regulation 1907/06, Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of
Chemicals (REACH), 2006 O.J. (L 396) (EC) [hereinafter REACH], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriSer.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:396:0001:0849:EN:PDF.
178. Applegate, supra note 126 (manuscript at 18-26).
179. Pedersen et al., supra note 13 1, at 5 ("The lack of data on the hazardous properties of
chemicals was the driving force behind the development of a new chemicals policy in the EU.").
180. REACH, supra note 177, art. 1(1), at 47 ("This Regulation is based on the principle that it
is for manufacturers, importers and downstream users to ensure that they manufacture, place on the
market or use such substances that do not adversely affect human health or the environment.").
181. Id. art. 5, at 62 (article entitled "No data, no market").
182. Id. art. 10, at 70-71; id. art. 14, at 77-79.
183. Strategyfor a Future Chemicals Policy, supra note 127, at 7-8. This White Paper defines
the "burden of the past" as the "30,000 'existing' chemicals estimated to be on the EU market, for
which little or no information is available, in particular about their long-term effects on human
health or the environment." Id. at 28.
184. See REACH, supra note 177, art. 13, at 75. As noted above, EPA uses structure-activity
relationships only for screening purposes. See supra note 154.
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The differences between REACH and TSCA can be overstated.' 85 Both
REACH and TSCA address chemical regulation in a comprehensive,
rationalist manner. They seek to grapple with the entire problem and to
assemble all of the relevant information. Scientific information is highly
privileged in this approach-REACH requires a "sound scientific basis" for
restrictions on chemicals' 86-and the ultimate standard for acceptability is
risk-as-probability. 187 Both the authorization and restriction phases of
REACH regulation require economic analysis and the justification of residual
hazards by benefits. 188 Fundamentally then, REACH also adopts a filling
strategy, but it deploys techniques like licensing and the use of structureactivity relationships that should increase the supply of data well above the
TSCA baseline.
2. More and Better Use of Information.-The supply of information can
be increased by better funding for chemical testing by the government or
government grantees, or by the use of new information technologies to
analyze and disseminate existing data. Adequate funding for toxicity
research is a chronic problem, and the federal contribution to chemical
research and development has been in a steady decline for years. 189 Several
innovative solutions have been suggested, such as Professor Lyndon's
"superstudy" funding proposal,' 90 but in the meantime, EPA's overall budget
for research, which includes many other kinds of research, declined
substantially between 1976 and 2005.191 Government has a particularly
important role to play in generating information in areas of structural market
185. Applegate, supra note 126 (manuscript at 31-44).
186. See REACH, supra note 177, art. 57(e), at 142; Commission Explanatory Memorandum
Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning REACH, at
vol. 1, 16, 37, COM (2003) 655 final (Oct. 29, 2003).
187. Both toxicity and exposure data are required in the base set of data for registration.
REACH, supra note 177, art. 10(a) & ann. VI, at 70, 307-15. Toxicity and exposure data are also
required in the chemical-safety report, id. art. 14, at 77, and in the terms of control for authorization,
id. art. 60(2), at 149. Exposure levels are a key element of control in restrictions. Id. arts. 69-70, at
165-68. REACH envisions a broader use of risk-as-hazard in its reliance on the intrinsic qualities
of chemicals to trigger certain regulatory actions, but the ultimate safety standards are probabilitybased. See id. art. 13, at 75-76 (descnbing the requirements for generation of information based on
the intrinsic properties of substances); id. art. 47, at 131 ("Where information on intrinsic properties
of a substance has been generated by reference to structurally related substance(s), the evaluation
may also cover these related substances.").
188. Id. arts. 60(4), 64(4)(b), at 150, 159 (addressing authorization-phase requirements); id.
arts. 68(1), 71, at 164, 169 (addressing restriction-phase requirements).
AM.

189. APPLEGATE & BAER, supra note 112, at 5. See also INTERSOCIETY WORKING GROUP,
ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., AAAS REPORT XXIX: RESEARCH AND

DEVELOPMENT FY 2005, at 21-28 (2004), available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/rd05main.htm
(providing details about research and development funding as part of the 2005 federal budget).
190. Lyndon, supra note 95, at 1837.
191. APPLEGATE & BAER, supra note 112, at 5 (citing AM. ASS'N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
SCI., AAAS R&D FUNDING UPDATE NOV. 29, 2004-FY 2005 FINAL APPROPRIATIONS, hist. tbl.2,

table available at http://www.aaas.org/spp/rd/hist05c2.pdf (reporting a decrease from $743 million
to $591 million in constant FY 2004 dollars)).
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failure, such as "orphan" chemicals, discontinued (but persistent) chemicals,
foundational research, and information that requires widespread inquiry
particularly expensive equipment or new
(such as epidemiology),
192
technologies.

Existing information can also be made more useful, and in that sense,
more plentiful, by the deployment of new technologies for data collection,
analysis, and dissemination. Professor Esty's projections of the impact of
new technologies on the data gap provides an excellent, if optimistic, survey
193
of "our ability to fill the information gaps" in environmental regulation.
Institutionally, government agencies are well positioned to assemble and
organize large amounts of information from studies published in scattered
publications, submitted through applications and reporting requirements, and
collected from monitoring and inspection. 194 Government is also uniquely
situated to provide uniform standards and formats for data, to define key data
sets (like SIDS), and to develop quality-control policies and practices. All of
these are activities that the U.S. and European governments currently engage
in to some degree, and they could usefully be expanded.
3. Voluntary Efforts.-EPA can also seek to obtain chemical
information through the voluntary efforts of the enterprises that produce and
use chemicals. Professors Coglianese, Zeckhauser, and Parson identify "two
basic strategies that regulators employ to secure information: exploit
asymmetries of interests across or within firms, and create incentives for
disclosure." 195 They consider a variety of techniques that apply these
strategies-mandated disclosure, rewards and recognition, formal interaction
between regulators and regulated entities-and they ultimately settle on
extensive informal interactions between the regulators and regulated as the
technique most likely to encourage voluntary information sharing. 196 EPA's
Office of Pollution Prevention and Toxic Substances (OPPTS) is firmly
committed to cooperative strategies (styled "partnerships"). 197 The High
Production Volume (HPV) Challenge Program is a particularly relevant
example of such partnerships. A collaboration between Environmental
Defense, the American Chemistry Council, and EPA, 198 the program calls on
192. John S. Applegate, The Government Role in Scientific Research: Who Should Bridge the
Data Gap in ChemicalRegulation?, in RESCUING SCIENCE FROM POLITICS: REGULATION AND THE
DISTORTION OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH 255, 268-75 (Wendy Wagner & Rena Steinzor eds., 2006).
193. Esty, supra note 134, at 155-61.
194. Applegate, supra note 22, at 271-73.
195. Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking Truth for Power:
InformationalStrategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 324-25 (2004).
196. Id. at 324-34.
197. See EPA, OPPTS Action Plan, Prevention, Pesticides and Toxic Substances,
http://www.epa.gov/oppts/pubs/programpriorities.htm
(last updated Jan. 31, 2008) (listing
"[p]artnerships and pollution prevention" as part of OPPTS's action plan).
198. EPA, High Production Volume (HPV) Challenge Program, http://www.epa.gov/chemrtk/
(last updated Mar. 20, 2008).
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the manufacturers of HPV chemicals to voluntarily make health and
environmental-impact data publicly available through sponsorship of
individual chemicals. 199 According to EPA, 1400 HPV chemicals have been
sponsored through the program (and more through international programs) as
of June 2007.200 While EPA characterizes data collection under the program
as "nearing its conclusion,"' '0 1 Environmental Defense has been extremely
critical of the actual results of the program.20 2
Several other voluntary programs exist (for example, the FYI program
under TSCA § 8(e)), and they do generate data.20 3 However, the structural
flaw in all of these programs is that, being voluntary, they give EPA no new
authority to demand that gaps actually be filled.20 4 So, when cooperation is
not forthcoming or voluntary commitments are not honored, EPA can only
resort to the inadequate filling techniques that we have already seen. EPA
implicitly acknowledges this problem by "redefin[ing] success" under its
chemical-testing programs to include voluntary approaches in its totals.20 5
While this may be fair enough as far as it goes, the width of the data gap
demonstrated above suggests that it is an extremely optimistic position.
Moreover, a recent Report by the EPA's Office of Inspector General was
highly critical of EPA's many voluntary programs. While EPA makes much
of their successes, the Report found that they lacked the kinds of measures

199. EPA, Voluntary Chemical Sponsorships-High Production Volume (HPV) Challenge,
http://www.epa.gov/hpv/pubs/general/volchems.htm (last updated Nov. 28, 2007).
200. EPA, High Production Volume (HPV) Challenge Program, supra note 198.
201. Id.
202. See RICHARD A. DENISON, ENVTL. DEF., HIGH HOPES, Low MARKS: A FINAL REPORT
CARD ON

THE

HPV CHEMICAL

CHALLENGE

3

(2007),

available at http://www.edf.org/

documents/6653_HighHopesLowMarks.pdf ("More than a year-and-a-half after it was to have been
completed, the High Production Volume (HPV) Chemical Challenge is still well away from
delivering on the promises it made.").
203. See Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2607 (2000) (requiring chemical
manufacturers to notify EPA of new information on their chemicals); CHEMICAL REGULATION,
supra note 155, 40-43 (describing EPA's HPV Challenge Program); Conrad, supra note 160, at
153-57 (explaining how the chemical industry voluntarily publishes risk information); EPA,
Chemical Information Collection and Data Development (Testing), http://www.epa.gov/
opptintr/chemtest/index.htm (last updated Dec. 19, 2007) (noting that TSCA gives EPA authority to
develop regulations for data development); EPA, High Production Volume (HPV) Challenge
Program, supra note 198 (noting that the HPV Challenge Program challenges companies to make
health and environmental information available to the public); EPA, TSCA Chemical Testing
Program Objectives, http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/chemtest/pubs/vision.htm (last updated Oct. 5,
2007) (listing emphasis on voluntary testing agreements as one approach to meet the program
goals).
204. For example, EPA's voluntary program for evaluating chemicals to which children are
particularly exposed gave the agency no authority to require data, so the agency had no recourse
against those who declined to provide it. Susanne Rust & Meg Kissinger, EPA Drops Ball on
Danger of Chemicals to Children, JS ONLINE, Mar. 29, 2008, http://www.jsonline.com/
story/index.aspx?id=733566.
205. EPA, TSCA Chemical Testing Program Objectives, supra note 170.
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and internal controls
20 6 that are needed to determine whether the programs are
in fact successful.
4. Competition-Based Regulation.-Professor Wagner has recently
offered the intriguing suggestion that more chemical information could be
generated by a regulatory mechanism that would (to use her phrase) "divide
and conquer" the manufacturers of chemicals by placing them in competition
with one another to demonstrate the superior safety of their products.20 7 By
creating a "market" for chemical-safety information where none currently
exist-the markets already perform well for utility and price information, of
course--competition among manufacturers would create a strong incentive
to generate (or reveal) the data that would demonstrate safety, lest a
competitor either demonstrate its own superior safety or another's greater
danger.20 8 "A company who receives an 'inferior' designation would, at the
very least, be required to label their product. ' 20 9 Liability consequences
(good or bad) would also be possible.
Wagner's proposal aims to improve on a filling strategy. Its objective is
"to dredge up more comprehensive and accurate information on chemical
risks and safer substitutes. ' 210 Moreover, it envisions a process of adversarial
hearings before EPA to establish superiority and assign appropriate labels to
products. 21 1 These would presumably be highly information-intensive
procedures-deliberately so, because their objective is to reveal and evaluate
as much chemical risk information as possible. As adjudicator, EPA would
not be in the position of generating the information (in this respect, it is like a
licensing scheme), so the amount of information would not be limited by
EPA's resources.2 12
5. Limitations on Filling Strategies.-The foregoing ideas are useful
and even important improvements in the supply-side strategy of filling the

206. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., EPA, Rep. No. 2007-P-00041, EVALUATION REPORT:
VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS COULD BENEFIT FROM INTERNAL POLICY CONTROLS AND A SYSTEMATIC
MANAGEMENT APPROACH 3 (2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2007/200709252007-P-0004 I.pdf. The HPV Challenge Program was among those examined. Id. at 17.
207. Wendy E. Wagner, Using Competition-BasedRegulation to Bridge the Toxics Data Gap,
83 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2008). See also Coglianese et al., supra note 195, at 297-302 (explaining
how regulators can exploit information asymmetry within an industry); David M. Driesen, Is
Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program? Replacing the Command and Control!
Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 343-47 (1998) (suggesting a
different kind of "environmental competition law").
208. Wagner, supra note 207.
209. Id.
210. Id.

211. Id. Professor Scott sees a similar process developing in Europe in response to the
substitution mandate of REACH. Joanne Scott, Regulating Chemicals under REACH, in EU
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND GOVERNANCE (Joanne Scott, ed.) (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at
18-20, on file with the Texas Law Review).
212. Id.
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data gap. Information costs can be lowered, and more effective incentive
systems can be established. But no matter who is required to generate the
information, how much efficiency is gained, or how great the incentives are
to generate data, the demands of the risk-as-probability approach are
extensive, expensive, and time-consuming. The REACH schedule-which is
intended to be extremely aggressive and is probably overly optimistic13
contemplates eleven years to fill the data gap for existing chemicals.
The fundamental limitation on filling strategies is that a quantified,
comprehensive approach to regulatory standards is an unquenchable thirst. It
is the nature of scientific inquiry that there are always more questions than
answers, and answers beget more questions. This approach to knowledge has
served science well, but-as the Ethyl Corp. court and other commentators
have observed-there is a basic mismatch between the needs and norms of
scientific inquiry and the needs of regulatory agencies to act preventively to
address environmental threats.21 4 Moreover, in the highly contested world of
regulatory action, a study that demonstrates one thing will always call forth a
new study to contradict it, creating at least apparent uncertainty. 215 The
response of the chemical industry to the Environmental Defense Fund's
Toxic Ignorance study is a case in point. The legal2 16 and political 21 7 rewards
of manufacturing uncertainty are obvious and practically irresistible. The
data gap is, from this perspective, a bottomless pit of uncertain and
contestable information, with never enough resources to fill it. Therefore,
while supply-side improvements may be very appropriate for the limited
demands of defining the problem as risk-as-hazard, they are not adequate to
support disciplining the response using risk-as-probability.
C. BridgingStrategies: Demand-Side Reform
The limitations of the supply-side strategy call for serious consideration
of a demand-side approach. Techniques that limit demand have some
obvious advantages for supporting an active program of chemical

213. REACH, supra note 177, art. 23(3), at 95; Diana Bowman & Geert van Calster, Reflecting
on REACH: Global Implications of the European Union's Chemicals Regulation, 4
NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 375, 376-77 (2007).
214. See, e.g., Howard Latin, Good Science, Bad Regulation. and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5
YALE J. ON REG. 89, 126-43 (1988) (discussing how reliance on "good science" can prevent the
development of an effective regulatory scheme).
215. See David Michaels & Celeste Monforton, Scientific Evidence in the Regulatory System:
Manufacturing Uncertainty and the Demise of the Formal Regulatory System, 13 J.L. & POL'Y 17,
31-38 (2005) (documenting the "doubt is our product" strategy of the tobacco companies and other
regulated industries).
216. See, e g, Gulf S. Insulanon v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d 1137, 1150 (5th
Cir. 1983) (vacating a Consumer Product Safety Commission ban on urea-formaldehyde foam
insulation in residences and schools after the regulated industry challenged that the science was
inconclusive).
217. See Thomas 0. McGarity, supra note 169, at 898-901 (discussing the rhetoric of "sound
science" as a criticism of environmental regulation).
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regulation." 8 A demand-side strategy reduces the amount of information
required in order to take regulatory action, permitting regulatory agencies to
spread their limited resources over a wider front--or in the case of stalled
programs like TSCA, to take mandatory action at all. A demand-side
strategy also avoids the bottomless-pit problem because, to continue the
metaphor, a bridge can span a gap of any depth. It bears emphasis, though,
that none of the bridging techniques are data-free. At a minimum, there must
be a prior determination that a particular substance poses a threat. Thus, all
of these bridging techniques require a regulatory trigger-risk-as-hazardthat defines the universe of chemicals requiring attention; the difference from
the supply-side baseline is that the regulatory standard is not risk-asprobability. Professors Shapiro and Schroeder, in their article on reorienting
cost-benefit analysis, recommend precisely this rethinking of the relationship
between trigger and standard. 21 9 By clearly distinguishing between them, the
regulatory system can exploit the different meanings of risk to reduce
information demands and bring them into equilibrium with supply.
1. Technology-Based and Incremental Standards.-The information
advantages of technology-based standards have been thoroughly reviewed by
others. 220 The capability of a "best available technology" is far more readily
and definitively determined than risk-as-probability; the former is largely a
matter of establishing proper categories of existing facilities and measuring
their performance. 22 1 While a technology-based standard is by no means a
trivial inquiry, its information demands "pale in comparison" with risk-asprobability standards. 222 On the risk side, technology-based standards only
require basic knowledge of the toxic properties of the chemical (risk-ashazard) for the purpose of initially identifying chemicals subject to
regulation. Thus, in the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress adopted
a technology-based standard (maximum achievable control technology
(MACT)), 2 3 in an effort to breathe life into a mostly dead (or slightly alive)
air-toxics program. The bulk of the risk reduction work is accomplished by

218. This Article takes as its premise the desirability of an active program of chemical
regulation. This is, of course, a contestable proposition. If one values scientific certainty above
regulatory expeditiousness-and some do-then a demand-side strategy will not commend itself.
219. Shapiro & Schroeder, supra note 107.
220. See, e.g., Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL.
L. REV. 83, 96-97 (describing the feasibility and tangible successes of technology-based standards).
See also David M. Dnesen, Distributingthe Costs of Environmental,Health, and Safety Protection:
The FeasibilityPrinciple, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and Regulatory Reform, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REv. 1, 18-34 (2005) (giving examples of effective technology-based standards and comparing
technology-based standards favorably with cost-benefit analysis); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0.
McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: The Rationalefor Technology-Based Regulation, 1991 Duke L.J.
729, 739-51 (making a normative argument for technology-based standards).
221. Wagner, supranote 220, at 96-97.
222. Karkkainen, supra note 109, at 1421.
223. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2)-(3) (2000).
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the primary MACT standard. However, if after application of MACT there
remains a residual risk above a "lifetime excess cancer risk[] to the
individual most exposed" of one in one million or more, then EPA must
establish a second set of standards that "provide an ample margin of safety to
protect public health" within eight years of the promulgation of the initial
standards. 224 By focusing first on the technology-based standard and only
secondarily on the risk-as-probability standard, EPA has been able to
complete most of its primary work on the congressional list of air pollutants
(not on time, of course, but no one expected that), and it has recently moved
225

on to the residual risk determinations.
The Clean Air Act Amendments exemplify not only a technology-based
standard, but also a more information-efficient, incremental approach to
setting regulatory standards. The weakness of technology-based standards
has always been their use of what is essentially a surrogate criterion for
environmental protection. Obviously, the point is not to require adoption of
any particular technology for its own sake, but rather to reduce hazards to
health and the environment. Even the best technology will not necessarily
achieve that goal, 226 and so technology-based standards are often used as an
interim measure on the way to solving the problem on its own, health-based
terms.227 The MACT standard is supposed to reduce the bulk of toxic
emissions relatively quickly, and it is followed by a risk-as-probability
standard to attain Congress's ultimate health-based objective. 228 Likewise,
while the later phases of the Clean Water Act are unfortunately more
rhetorical than real, the original intention of the statute was that the primary
technology-based standards be replaced in the fullness of time with standards
that would attain "fishable-swimmable" 229 waters, and finally,
230 that "the
eliminated.,
be
waters
navigable
the
into
discharge of pollutants

224. Id § 7412(f)(2)(A). Before setting the secondary standards, EPA was to report to
Congress on possible legislative alternatives to this standard, id. § 7412(f)(2); however, since
Congress took no action to change it, the risk-based standard remains applicable. The secondary
standard in the 1990 Amendments is the same as the primary standard before 1990.
225. David P. Novello, The Air Toxics Program at the Crossroads: From MACT to Residual
Risk, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, winter 2004, at 57.
226. Wagner, supra note 220, at 110-11. By the same token, the best available technology can
also overshoot risk-based objectives, though this is a rarer phenomenon. See, e.g., Hazardous Waste
Treatment Council v. EPA, 886 F.2d 355, 362-64 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (finding that EPA's adoption of
a best demonstrated available technology (BDAT) standard with regard to certain types of waste
disposal was actually more stringent than a contemplated human-health standard).
227. Novello, supra note 225, at 61.
228. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(0; see also Babich, supra note 105, at 128-30 (describing simultaneous
use of technology and nsk-based systems); id. at 179-81 (describing the use of risk to adjust
technology-based standards).
229. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (2000). "Fishable-swimmable" is the colloquial
descnption of the goal.
230. Id. § 1251(a)(1). The goal of elimination was to be achieved by 1985, hence the
skepticism about the reality of the goal.
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An incremental approach, which makes decisions through several
relatively small steps, contrasts with the comprehensive rationality that riskas-probability and cost-benefit analyses represent.2 3' Canada's chemicals
program, for example, operates on the basis of triage, focusing not on
absolute and quantified risk, but on relative hazard. 32 Following this path,
Canada has made great strides in establishing standards for the chemicals of
greatest concern.2 33 Incrementalism, as its advocates have noted, is dynamic
and flexible; it adjusts to new circumstances, handles uncertainty well, and
235
234
It has distinct weaknesses, too,
also permits learning from experience.

but one undeniable advantage is the lower demand for new information.
Smaller steps make better use of existing knowledge and do not make the
ravenous information demands that comprehensive solutions do.
2. Market-Mimicking
Techniques.-Traditional
"command-andcontrol" regulation calls on government to do most of the work of
assembling relevant information and choosing an appropriate response.
Because governmental action is subject to strict legal requirements of
procedural regularity and substantive political and judicial review, such
regulation demands a great deal of supporting information, regardless of the
techniques employed.
Market-based techniques place the burden of
information gathering and even, within limits, decision making, primarily on
private actors, giving them an ability and incentive to make decisions more
information-efficiently.
a. Pollution Taxes.-Market-based, or market-like, regulatory
techniques are frequently advocated as efficient improvements to the

231. This distinction has its origin in Charles F. Lindblom's germinal article, The Science of
"Muddling Through ", 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79 (1959), which Professor Diver originally applied to
administrative law in Diver, supra note 106, at 396-401. It has proven to be an extremely useful
framework for analyzing risk regulation in subsequent scholarship. MCGARITY, supra note 51, at
24-25; SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 5, at 22-27; Hornstein, supra note 102, at 385-88.
232. See What is Categorization?-Chemical Substances, http://www.chemicalsubstances
chimiques.gc.ca/categor/what-quol/indexe.html (last updated Apr. 20, 2007) (describing Canada's
categorization according to relative hazard as its first step in scientifically assessing both new and
existing chemical substances to determine whether measures should be taken to control their use or
release).

233. See DENISON, supra note 159, at IV-23 to IV-25 (detailing the program's categorization
process, which identifies a subset of chemicals as "highest priority" and establishes a related
chemicals management plan).
234. See Holly Doremus, Precaution,Science, and Learning While Doing in NaturalResource
Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547, 550-57 (2007) (describing adaptive management). See also
Scott, supra note 211 (manuscript at 20-24) (describing the "provisionality" of certain aspects of
REACH).
235. Indeed, Professor Diver used carcinogens to exemplify the need for a comprehensive
approach because of the severity of the toxic threat. Diver, supra note 106, at 431-32. Since Diver
wrote in 1981, Congress has become more comfortable with a spectrum of risk and a tiered
approach to toxics, as embodied in the Clean Air Act Amendments. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2)-(3)
(2000). See supra text accompanying notes 222-30.
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traditional command-and-control regulatory system because they give
individual regulated entities a high degree of flexibility in deciding how best
to reduce the risks they create. 36 The deterrent effect of tort law operates in
this way, inasmuch as individual actors can choose to modify their risk237
creating conduct-or not-in response to the prospect of future liability.
This approach, however, allows the polluter to make its own risk decisions
without collective input, which is an especially troublesome problem in the
context of toxic risks, where not all costs are internalized. 238 The polluter can
impose a greater level of risk than the public might otherwise accept, or
distribute the risk in ways that are economically efficient but otherwise unfair
or unjust. Pollution-tax systems suffer a similar defect. They enjoy
widespread theoretical support for their efficiency, 239 but they have been
rarely adopted.24 °
On the other hand, tax systems have a substantial information advantage
over traditional regulation. Unless the tax rate is assigned in order to "fine
tune" risk levels-in which case it would make far more sense just to offer
flexibility within a traditional system, like "bubbles" 2 41-setting the rate
should not require the kind of detailed risk assessment that is associated with
risk-as-probability. 42 Indeed, given the flexibility permitted by a tax, the
exposure side of the risk equation could not even be estimated for such
purposes. A tax or charge system, in other words, raises many issues which
may make them unsuitable for chemical regulation, but they would have the
advantage of reducing data demands.
236. See generally STEPHEN JOHNSON, ECONOMICS, EQUITY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 17-58

(2004) (examining the advantages, limitations, types, and implications of pollution taxes, charges,
and fees); Adam Chase, The Efficiency Benefits of "Green Taxes ": A Tribute to Senator John
Heinz, I1 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 9-30 (1992) (contrasting the demonstrated efficacy of
market-based initiatives like taxes or subsidies with the practical and theoretical problems of direct
government regulation in efficiently incentivizing pollution control).
237. Theories of Tort Law (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy), http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/tort-theories/#4 (last modified Oct. 20, 2003).
238. See Martin T. Katzman, Pollution Liability Insurance and Catastrophic Environmental
Risk, 55 J. RISK & INSURANCE 75, 77-79 (1988) (noting that industrial costs are not always
internalized, particularly those stemming from chemical pollution).
239. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 236, at 21-22 (discussing efficiency as a reason economists
support taxing activities that generate environmental damages).
240. See id. (discussing the "preservation of the current environmental command and control
system").
241. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 840-42 (1984) (describing the bubble
concept as it applies to the Clean Air Act). See generally Jesse Ratcliffe, Reenvisioning the Risk
Bubble: Utilizing a System of Intra-Firm Risk Trading for Environmental Protection, 92 CAL. L.
REV. 1779, 1808 (2004) (describing regulatory "bubbles" as a permissible amount of environmental
harm by a single polluting organization rather than a single emission source).
242. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 HARV. L. REV. 713, 748-52 (1996); see also Chase, supra note 236, at 5 n.13
(responding to Richard Posner's concern that it would be impossible to accumulate enough
information to form a pollution-tax schedule by pointing out that the information requirements of a
pollution tax are actually not as great as those required by other suggested methods of restricting
pollution).
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b. Penalty Default Rules.-In an important article on contract law,
Professors Ayers and Gertner introduced the idea of "penalty default"
provisions as legal techniques for incentivizing the production of relevant
information. 243 A penalty default specifies a harsh provision for one party
unless that party can demonstrate, by providing additional information in the
bargaining process, that a different provision is more appropriate. 2 " As
explained by Professors Ayers and Gertner:
Penalty defaults are designed to give at least one party to the contract
an incentive to contract around the default rule and therefore to choose
affirmatively the contract provision they prefer. In contrast to the
received wisdom, penalty defaults are purposefully set at what the
parties would not want-in order to encourage the parties to reveal
information to each other or to third parties (especially the courts).24 5
Professor Karkkainen and others have recognized the possibilities that
penalty defaults offer in the environmental setting, noting that several
implicit penalty-default provisions already exist.246 California's Proposition
65247 bans both the discharge of carcinogens into drinking water 248 and the
failure to notify individuals of exposure to carcinogens, unless the discharger
can demonstrate an acceptably low level of risk. 249 The penalty default is the
ban on discharge or exposure, and it creates an incentive for the discharger
not only to come up with information, but also to support regulation, since a
regulation establishing an acceptable risk level acts as a safe harbor against
liability under the law. Proposition 65 has been immensely successful in
creating hundreds of carcinogen standards.25 °
At one level, Proposition 65 is a straightforward burden-shifting device
for supplying more chemical information, like the licensing statutes we have
seen. However, it also reduces information demand in two ways. First, the
trigger for action is a finding of risk-as-hazard ("a chemical known to the

243. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory
of Contract Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989); see also Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic
Bargainingand the Economic Theory of Contract DefaultRules, 100 YALE L.J. 615, 620-23 (1990)
(analyzing the "penalty default" rule as an "information-forcing paradigm" and examining its
effects on the incentives at play in basic contract disputes).
244. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 243, at 91.
245. Id.
246. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Adaptive Ecosystem Management and Regulatory
Penalty Defaults: Toward a Bounded Pragmatism,87 MINN. L. REV. 943, 970-75 (2003) (applying
penalty defaults to the Endangered Species Act).
247. Proposition 65 was an initiative measure approved on November 4, 1986, and codified as
the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 25249.5-.13 (West 2006).
248. Id. § 25249.5.
249. Id. § 25249.6.
250. Carl Cranor, Information Generation and Use Under Proposition 65: Model Provisions
for Other PostmarketLaws?, 83 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2008); Karkkainen, supra note 172, at 87175.
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state to cause cancer or reproductive toxicity") 251 and the initial standard is

simple-a ban on discharges or unwarned exposures. Second, only the
secondary, optional standard (a discharger can choose to pursue one or not) is
based on risk-as-probability, that is, "significant risk. 252 And even this riskas-probability standard is less demanding of information because industry
has a huge incentive to accept regulation based on a scientific record that, in
other circumstances, it would have an incentive to challenge as insufficient
or too highly contested.25 3
Penalty-default rules are a subset of a larger category of regulatory
techniques that Professors Shapiro and Glicksman call "back-end
adjustment., 254 These techniques establish a strict primary standard and then
permit deviation from that standard for good cause. Examples are legion:
deadline extensions, waivers and exemptions, enforcement discretion,
periodic review, and others. 255 Back-end adjustment permits generalized
regulation while recognizing the inevitability of unforeseen facts and factors.
It can account for changed circumstances; it makes a strict regulatory
baseline more politically and economically acceptable by providing a safety
valve; and it can supply more information by casting the burden of proof
upon the seeker of the exemption. 256 For our purposes, the major advantage
is that back-end adjustment, like incrementalism generally, limits the amount
of information needed to address a problem, requiring fine tuning only as
needed.25 7
c. Environmental Performance Bonds.-The idea of an
environmental-performance bond is that the proponent of a hazardous
product, activity, or technology (the technique is most suited to the "macro"
setting of ecological harm, such as road building and timber sales) must
obtain in advance a bond sufficient to cover the worst-case consequences of
its actions. 8 The objective is more to influence the timing of information

251. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.5.

252. Id. § 25249.10(c) (establishing the "significant nsk" standard). Significant risk is defined
in the applicable regulations as "calculated to result in one excess case of cancer in an exposed
population of 100,000, assuming lifetime exposure at the level in question." CAL. CODE REGS. tit.
22, § 12703(b) (2006). The structure of a primary standard not based on risk and a secondary
standard based on risk-as-probability parallels the 1990 revision of § 112 of the Clean Air Act.
§ 12(d)(2)-(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2)-(3) (2000). See supra text accompanying notes 220-30.
253. Roe, supra note 121, at 10,235-36. See generally Clifford Rechtschaffen & Patrick
Williams, The Continued Success ofProposition 65 in Reducing Toxic Exposures, 35 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. Law Inst.) 10,850 (2005) (listing changes made in consumer products as a result of
Proposition 65 regulation and litigation).
254. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 5, at 158-59.
255. Id. at 158.
256. Id at 158-72.
257. Id.at 170-72.
258. Ian Bowles et al., Economic Incentives and Legal Tools for Private Sector Conservation, 8
DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 209, 234-35 (1998); David R. Hodas, The Role of Law in Defining
Sustainable Development: NEPA Reconsidered, 3 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 1, 54-55 (1998).
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generation (before an activity begins) and who pays to generate the
information (buyers and sellers of bonds), than it is to affect the amount of
information demanded. 259 Nevertheless, like Proposition 65, it has real
demand-reduction potential. It creates a market incentive to generate only as
much information as needed to set a price for the bond-and no more. Both
the sellers and purchasers of bonds will have an incentive to reduce the
information costs (the transaction costs) associated with issuing the bonds,
but not below the seller's need to assess accurately its actuarial risk.
3. Incentives for Safer Substitutes.-Instead of attempting to quantify
the acceptable level of exposure to toxic chemicals, several regulatory
techniques create incentives to substitute safer chemicals for those currently
in use. Professor Wagner's competition proposal is an example. 26 0 These
techniques are not aimed at information as such; instead, they take as a
premise that we should always be looking for safer products and, therefore,
across-the-board incentives should be created. 26' This approach necessarily,
if implicitly, adopts a risk-as-hazard trigger to define the universe of
governmental concern as the chemicals that pose a level of danger that
warrants regulatory attention. The regulatory standard, however, is not riskas-probability or risk of any kind. Rather, the response is constrained to a set
of actions that (except for phase-outs) operate as ongoing incentives and not
as specific commands.
The most direct such approach is to make substitution unavoidable by
banning the offending chemical. This technique has been rarely employed,
but when it has been used it has been extremely effective, as in the ban of
lead in gasoline or of chlorofluorocarbons as a refrigerant or propellant.262
The key to making bans work, as Professor Houck reminds us, is "lead time
and competitiveness. 2 63 The industries subject to the ban must have time to
make adjustments, and they should not be disadvantaged relative to others
similarly situated. A phase-out does not, in principle, require massive
amounts of precise data; rather, it operates on the basis of the general
conclusion that a chemical must go. 264 It is then up to the producers and

259. It has been called a combination of the precautionary and polluter-pays principles. Bowles
et al., supra note 258, at 242.
260. See supra notes 207-12 and accompanying text.
261. See id.
262. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman et al., Applying Cost-Benefit to Past Decisions: Was
Environmental Protection Ever a Good Idea?, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 155, 161 (2005) (noting that
EPA's ban on lead in gasoline rapidly lowered the level of lead in blood); Cass R. Sunstein, Of
Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 11 (2007) (stating that
EPA's ban on chlorofluorocarbons in aerosols significantly reduced the American contribution to
the depletion of the ozone layer).
263. Oliver A. Houck, The Regulation of Toxic Pollutants Under The Clean Water Act, 21
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law. Inst.) 10,528, 10,554 (1991).
264. This was the issue before the D.C. Circuit in Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.
1976) (en banc), which addressed the phase-out of lead in gasoline. See supra section II(C)(I).
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users of the chemical to find a solution (in effect, technology-based) within
the time permitted for compliance.
4. Burden of Continued Registration.-The substitution of safer
chemicals is a central theme of the European REACH legislation.26 5 REACH
has the dual mission of protecting human health and the environment, and
advancing the "competitiveness and innovation" of the chemical industry. 66
It does not, therefore, seek a chemical-free future. Instead, dangerous
chemicals are to be "progressively replaced by suitable alternative substances
or technologies where these are economically and technically viable. 267 The
principal technique for achieving this goal is the allocation of the burden of
proof of safety to manufacturers. They are ultimately responsible for the
safety of their products, and they must provide certain hazard information to
downstream users of chemicals and to consumers. 268 REACH's authorization procedure for the most dangerous chemicals-chemicals that have
met a risk-as-hazard threshold defined principally by their inherent
characteristics-is more direct. The procedure is public and expensive, and
if the chemical cannot be adequately controlled, the manufacturer must show
that the product's benefits outweigh its risks. 269 Finally, the authorization
procedure requires the disclosure and analysis of substitute substances.27 °
In the United States, TSCA requires information about substitute
chemicals to be included in the findings supporting a restriction on a
chemical. 271 However, unlike REACH, TSCA's requirement is intended to
focus attention on the costs of restrictions, rather than opportunities for
substitution. Consequently, the primary effect of this requirement seems to
have been to increase the already heavy burden of promulgating regulations,
rather than to generate information about substitutes. 272 EPA has been more
effective at achieving substitution by using informal techniques like
(ironically enough) targeted information demands. A data call-in under
FIFRA 2 7 3 can encourage the discontinuation of an existing pesticide of
265. See Applegate, supra note 126 (manuscript at 26) (describing REACH's incentives for the
development of safer chemicals).
266. REACH, supra note 177, art. 1(I), at 47. The Commission's White Paper on chemicals
said: "It is essential to promote the competitiveness of the chemical industry and encourage
innovation, and in particular the development of safer chemicals." Strategyfor a Future Chemicals
Policy, supra note 127, at 8.
267. REACH, supra note 177, art. 55, at 138; see also Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy,
supra note 127, at 8.
268. Strategyfor a Future ChemicalsPolicy, supra note 127, at 8.
269. REACH, supra note 177, art. 60(4), at 150.
270. Id. art. 60(4)-(5), at 150-51.
271. 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1)(C) (2000).
272. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings, Inc. v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1220 (5th Cir. 1991)
("Under TSCA, therefore, the EPA must present a stronger case to justify the ban, as opposed to
regulation, of products with no substitutes.").
273. 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(2) (2000). See Applegate, supra note 22, at 313-14 (discussing the
FIFRA's data call-in provision).
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limited utility by making it too expensive to continue the registration, with
the intention of encouraging the use of newer, safer pesticides (or pesticidefree practices). However, this technique is wholly discretionary with EPA,2 74
and thus it resists systemization and accountability.
A set of techniques that might collectively be called "reputation taxes"
creates different incentives to use safer substitutes. The federal Toxics
Release Inventory (TRI),275 California's Proposition 65,276 and REACH277 all
require public disclosure of the releases of toxic chemicals into the
environment. The recipients of this information-the general public, directly
or through the intermediaries like environmental advocacy groups-can do
what they like with the information, whether through personal buying
choices or political activism.2 78 The Internet magnifies the impact of such
disclosures.
These right-to-know provisions do not directly forbid the use or
production of such chemicals or calibrate the appropriate levels of exposure
to them. Instead, they create a generalized incentive to abandon them or to
limit their use. A warning requirement is thus like the pollution taxes
discussed above: while both are a disincentive to an activity, they ultimately
leave it up to the individual actor to decide how to respond to the likely
consequences of publicity.2 79 Moreover, like a tax, the optional nature of the
incentive means that the level of information required to satisfy the
regulatory machinery is far less than for a risk-as-probability standard. In
any event, experience with Proposition 65 has shown that public information
makes the use and release of the listed chemicals extremely unattractive.28 °
The drafters of REACH, too, expressly looked to disclosure to reduce the use

274. See Applegate, supra note 22, at 313-14 (explaining EPA's use, or lack thereof, of data
call-ins under the FIFRA).
275. Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 110230) (2000) (requiring EPA to "establish and maintain in a computer data base a national
toxic-chemical inventory" and to "make these data accessible by computer telecommunication and
other means"). EPCRA is known also as the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11023 (2000).
276. Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986 (Proposition 65), CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 25249.6 (West 2006).
277. REACH, supra note 177, art. 77(2)-(3), at 175-78.
278. See generally JAMES T. HAMILTON, REGULATION THROUGH REVELATION: THE ORIGIN,
POLITICS, AND IMPACTS OF THE TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM 208-43 (2005) (giving

examples of various studies and other uses of TRI data); David W. Case, CorporateEnvironmental
Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV.
379, 381-82 (2005) ("Based in large part on the notoriety of the Toxics Release
Inventory... numerous policy reports argued that mandatory public distribution of information had
the potential to effect substantial improvements in industrial environmental performance.").
279. Cranor, supra note 250.
280. See Rechtschaffen & Williams, supra note 253, at 10,851-56 (describing litigation that has
resulted from the use of chemicals listed under Proposition 65 without proper warning).
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of toxic chemicals and to encourage the development of new and safer
substitutes.281
5. The PrecautionaryPrinciple.-Theprecautionary principle, which is
emerging as a central element of international environmental law, directly
addresses the gap between the demand for and supply of chemical and other
environmentally relevant information. The most widely accepted version is
in the 1992 Rio Declaration, which reads: "Where there are threats of serious
or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation. 28 2 The precautionary principle is not, properly speaking, a
regulatory technique at all because it operates at a much higher level of
generality. 283 Nevertheless, it can provide some useful guidance as an
approach ("approach" is the term used in the Rio Declaration) 284 for
regulatory systems.
The fulcrum of the precautionary principle is its timing provision"lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for
postponing .. ,285 It is intended to permit regulatory action to proceed
without the kind of comprehensive information that is associated with the
risk-as-probability strategy. 286 In this sense, the precautionary principle

281. See Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy, supra note 127, at 26-27; QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS ON REACH § 6.2.1 (July 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/
chemicals/pdf/qa.pdf. The Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction Act (TURA), MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 211 (2004 & Supp. 2006), requires the creation of actual reduction and substitution plans, which
are not necessarily available to the public, to encourage internally motivated action by firms rather
than to generate public pressure. See Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based
Regulation: PrescribingPrivateManagement to Achieve Public Goals, 37 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 691,
700 (2003) (describing TURA as a management-based regulation that encourages firms to make
gains in the prevention of pollution by requiring them to develop systems for reducing the use and
emissions of toxins); Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and
Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 354-56 (2001)
(describing the structured self-monitoring program as an ambitious plan that encourages costeffective innovation, but at the expense of public transparency and participation).
282. Rio Declaration,supra note 24, princ. 15, at 879.
283. Alessandra Arcuri, The Case for a Procedural Version of the PrecautionaryPrinciple
Erring on the Side of Environmental Preservation 15 (Global Law Working Paper No. 09/04),
available at http://www.nyulawglobal.org/workingpapers/GLWP_0904.htm;
Elizabeth Fisher,
Precaution,PrecautionEverywhere: Developing a 'Common Understanding' of the Precautionary
Principle in the European Community, 9 MAASTRICHT J. EUROPEAN & COMPAR. L. (Neth.) 7, 1517 (2002). American commentators often fail to grasp this point and treat it as akin to a statutory
pronouncement. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversibleand Catastrophic,91 CORNELL L. REV.
841, 855 (2006) (arguing that the precautionary principle is incoherent and should not be the central
focus of a system of risk regulation); see also Elizabeth Fisher, Book Review, 69 MOD. L. REV.
288, 289-91 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE (2005)).

284. Rio Declaration,supra note 24, princ. 15, at 879.
285. Id. (emphasis added).
286. See Applegate, supra note 30, at 17-34 (discussing timing and other elements of the
precautionary principle).
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seeks to bridge the data gap by reducing the demand for information at the
time that some regulatory action is taken. In the terminology of this Article,
the phrase "threats of serious or irreversible damage" represents the trigger or
definition of the problem. It looks very much like risk-as-hazard, inasmuch
as it lends itself to interpretation as risk and does not suggest a precise
quantitative meaning. The precautionary principle's standard, however, is
not disciplined by risk-as-probability, but rather by the more flexible
terminology of "cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation."
The "threats of serious or irreversible damage" trigger came to be
viewed, by supporters and critics alike, as a very open-ended trigger for
regulatory action, especially in the context of incomplete information.2 87
However, "cost-effective measures" came to be seen by critics as insufficient
to discipline overzealous governmental action. 288 Therefore, to counteract
overzealousness or misuse of the principle,28 9 later versions and
interpretations of the precautionary principle added another requirement,
iteration.290 Iteration is less easily derived from the text than the trigger,
standard, and timing elements are, but it follows from the idea that regulatory
action can be taken on the basis of uncertainty. Such actions, the reasoning
goes, should be revisited if additional or contradictory information comes to
light.29 l Versions of the precautionary principle that adopt the iteration
requirement do not, as a result, entirely abandon the filling strategy; filling is
ultimately expected. However, like the Clean Air Act Amendments, they
adopt a bridging strategy in the interim by permitting protective measures to
be put into place pending full information.

287. See id. at 24-26 (describing the shift to more stringent formulations of the trigger element
over time).
288. See id. at 31-33 (tracing the development of this criticism).
289. Improper trade restrictions are prominent in the consideration of the precautionary
principle, because it is primarily a feature of international law, which also concerns itself with
reducing trade barriers.
Much of the pressure to restrict the pnnciple comes from trade
orgamzations and interests concerned that the open-ended, risk-as-hazard trigger would become the
basis for disguised trade bamers.
290. See, e.g., Communicationfrom the Commission on the PrecautionaryPrinciple,at 16-17,
COM (2000) 1 final (Feb. 2, 2000), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.
do?uri=COM:2000:0001:FIN:EN:PDF ("An assessment of the potential consequences of inaction
and of the uncertainties of the scientific evaluation should be considered by decision-makers when
determining whether to trigger action based on the precautionary principle."); Agreement on the
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, art. 5.7, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1867 U.N.T.S. 243, 293 (1994), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs -e/legal-e/15-sps.pdf (stating that in situations where sanitary
measures are provisionally adopted, "[m]embers shall seek to obtain the additional information
necessary for a more objective assessment of nsk and review the [measures] accordingly within a
reasonable period of time").
291. Different versions of the principle take different positions on whether iteration is
mandatory or permissive, who has the responsibility to continue the investigation, and how
persuasive the new information must be to overturn the original action. Applegate, supra note 30,
at 3 1-33.
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Conclusion: Harnessing Information

This Article has three objectives. The first is to develop a framework
for understanding the rise of risk as the centerpiece of the regulatory system
for chemicals and pesticides. We have seen that risk has different meanings
and functions, and that the emphasis has shifted from the use of risk-ashazard to define the toxics problem to the use of risk-as-probability to
discipline the regulatory response. Risk, in the form of risk-as-hazard, came
to define the regulatory universe for toxic chemicals because it facilitated the
fundamental precautionary objective of environmental regulation. Risk-ashazard, however, is very open-ended, and the perceived need to constrain
governmental action resulted in the deployment of risk-as-probability to
discipline the regulatory response.
The second objective is to illuminate the informational consequences of
the shift from risk-as-hazard to risk-as-probability. The shift created a high
level of demand for chemical information that is technical, expensive, and
scarce. The result is a well-documented chemical data gap. The data gap, in
turn, frustrates an active and comprehensive program of chemical regulation.
The final objective is to put the foregoing framework to use in
addressing the data gap and, it is hoped, in revitalizing protective chemical
regulation. Two broad strategies are available to address the data gap. The
baseline approach-filling-seeks to supply a high level of demand for
information. This approach has had limited success, as the continuing large
scale of the data gap attests, though there are clearly techniques that would
improve the effectiveness of this strategy. The alternative strategybridging-seeks to limit the demand for information. Numerous techniques
are available for bridging the data gap. They have in common the reliance on
risk-as-hazard to define the problem and the avoidance of risk-as-probability
as the primary regulatory standard. A bridging strategy therefore harnesses
the power of information by reducing demand and making the available
information count. Instead of drowning in a sea of uncertain and conflicting
data, regulatory agencies can apply manageable amounts of actually
obtainable data to protect human health and the environment from chemical
hazards.
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